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PREFACE 
 
Who am I? They often tell me                                                                                                                               
I would step from my cell’s confinement                                                                                              
calmly, cheerfully, firmly,                                                                                                                  
like a squire from his country-house. 
Who am I? They often tell me                                                                                                            
I would talk to my warders                                                                                                        
freely and friendly and clearly,                                                                                                         
as though it were mine to command. 
Who am I? They also tell me                                                                                                                  
I would bear the days of misfortune                                                                                                                                                                                                 
equably, smilingly, proudly,                                                                                                                  
like one accustomed to win. 
Am I then really all that which other men tell of?                                                                           
Or am I only what I know of myself,                                                                                                
restless and longing and sick, like a bird in a cage,                                                                            
struggling for breath, as though hands were compressing my throat,                                                 
yearning for colours, for flowers, for the voices of birds,                                                                  
thirsting for words of kindness, for neighborliness,                                                                           
trembling with anger at despotisms and pretty humiliation,                                                                   
tossing in expectation of great events,                                                                                                     
powerlessly trembling for friends at an infinite distance,                                                                  
weary and empty at praying, at thinking, at making,                                                                          
faint, and ready to say farewell to it all? 
Who am I? This or the other?                                                                                                           
Am I one person today, and tomorrow another?                                                                               
Am I both at once? A hypocrite before others,                                                                                  
and before myself a contemptibly woebegone weakling?                                                                
Or is something within me still like a beaten army,                                                                          
fleeing in disorder from victory already achieved? 
Who am I? They mock me, these lonely questions of mine.                                                           
Whoever I am, thou knowest, O God, I am thine. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, I explore the relationship between political theology and the ethical 
problem of tyrannicide in the life and works of German pastor and theologian Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer.  Beginning with an examination of his theological views, I argue that Bonhoeffer’s 
Christo-centric worldview forms the basis of his subsequent ethical and political beliefs, as well 
as his motivation for participating in an assassination plot against Adolph Hitler.  Bonhoeffer’s 
desire to connect his understanding of Jesus Christ to the entirety of human life leads him to 
develop an unsystematic theological approach to ethics and the relationship between church and 
government.  Concluding with an exposition on the implications of Bonhoeffer’s resistance 
against the Nazi state with respect to Christian sinfulness, I argue that Bonhoeffer’s political 
theology is ultimately characterized by faith.  Rather than claiming his actions are justified 
according to ethical principles or just war arguments, Bonhoeffer acts against what he considered 
to be an evil force with the hope that his God offers forgiveness for those acting boldly yet 
sinfully.      
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I will argue that mid-twentieth century pastor and theologian Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s participation in an assassination plot against Adolph Hitler represents an ethical 
problem for responsible Christian action in politics.  This question of tyrannicide will be 
addressed in four chapters devoted to understanding Bonhoeffer’s beliefs and self-understanding 
on the on the theological, ethical, and political implications of his actions.  I begin by discussing 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology, or his efforts to ground the meaning of human life in a Christo-centric 
worldview.  The implications of this Christological worldview inform Bonhoeffer’s approach to 
basic questions of ethics, particularly in contrast to other philosophical traditions.  Finally, there 
are two chapters exploring how the relationship between his theological and ethical teachings 
influence his understanding of church and government.  I will conclude by exploring the 
question of sinfulness with respect to Bonhoeffer’s actions.  Does he present a defense of his 
actions on theological or ethical grounds, or does believe his actions ultimately violate his 
Christian commitments?  I will conclude by observing that while Bonhoeffer never directly 
admits that his participation in the plot was sinful, his writings at the end of his life vaguely point 
to an acceptance of the possibility that he has sinned in aiding violent resistance against Hitler 
and a desire for forgiveness from the God he attempts to serve.  Nonetheless, although there are 
reasons to suspect Bonhoeffer may have been unwilling to give his actions full ethical 
endorsement, he also never expresses regret for assisting in a murderous plot.  Bonhoeffer’s 
ultimate conclusion is that responsible Christians must act in a “bold venture of faith” against 
injustice without certainty that their actions will be justified.  Instead, they must place their faith 
in the mercy of God and in the example of Jesus Christ.   
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This argument will be presented in four chapters in which I attempt to present Bonhoeffer’s 
thinking from the ground upward, beginning with his emphasis on Jesus Christ as the central 
figure around whom reality is focused and attaching that belief to his political actions.  The four 
chapters are: Bonhoeffer’s Christology, Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, Church and Government One, and 
Church and Government Two. 
Beginning with the Christology chapter, I will argue that Bonhoeffer’s thought begins and 
ends with a focus on the importance of Jesus Christ to the historical situation of individuals in 
this life.  Furthermore, Bonhoeffer challenges philosophical views from the Western tradition 
which he believes have contributed to the challenges facing Germany at the time of his writing.  
Bonhoeffer wishes to ground the meaning of human lives, ethics, and political life directly in the 
person of Jesus Christ, or the God who became human.  Any worldview that appeals to deities, 
ethical programs, or natural forces for a justification of Christian life is unsatisfactory.  His 
primary theological goal is to understand all of human life given the immediate importance of 
Jesus Christ to reality, both at the level of everyday human experience as well as creation 
broadly speaking.  Therefore, although Bonhoeffer presumably hopes his work is applicable to 
all persons, his Christian presuppositions are inescapable when examining his beliefs.  For the 
purposes of understanding his political theology and actions, I will assume the primary audience 
of his works were, indeed, Christians.  It would be difficult to expect his contemporaries to be 
persuaded by appeals to the importance of Jesus Christ if they did not recognize the authority of 
Christian beliefs.  Therefore, the conclusions of this thesis are similarly most applicable those 
who would share Bonhoeffer’s presuppositions, especially Protestants.  His Christological views 
form the center of all of his subsequent thinking, including his ethics and politics.   
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 In the chapter entitled “Bonhoeffer’s Ethics,” I explore the implications of Bonhoeffer’s 
Christology for his understanding of Christian ethics, especially in contrast to conflicting ethical 
programs from classical and modern political thought.  In order to explore the relationship 
between Bonhoeffer’s beliefs and actions, particularly in light of his complicity in a conspiracy 
to commit an act of violence, it is helpful to distinguish Bonhoeffer’s ethical views from much of 
the Western intellectual tradition preceding him.  Although this contrast is not exhaustive, 
emphasizing the theological grounding of Bonhoeffer’s ethical thought is beneficial to 
understanding his political theology.  Against the analysis of many commentators of Bonhoeffer, 
I argue that his ethical views are inseparable from the Christo-centric theology that underlies his 
pastoral work, as well as his involvement in the German churches.  In order to proceed from 
Bonhoeffer’s theology to his political actions, the intermediary role of ethics must be explored.  
In particular, Bonhoeffer’s rejection of paradigmatic schools of ethics thought (e.g. 
deontological, virtue, or consequentialist) in exchange for discipleship toward the will of God is 
key.  As a Christian attempting to apply his beliefs to the historical crisis surrounding him, 
Bonhoeffer’s actions cannot be interpreted apart from the extent to which his Christian beliefs 
inform his understanding of ethical behavior.  I conclude that Bonhoeffer’s view of ethics is 
grounded solely in the pursuit of God’s will in the context of his historical situation.  He argues 
that since ethics receive their authorization from ‘above,’ or from God alone, then the most 
primordial concern of Christian ethical life must be to follow the will of God in the time and 
place circumstances of human life.    
 After discussing Bonhoeffer’s view of ethics, I then move to two chapters dealing with 
Bonhoeffer’s views on the relationship between church and government.  The first section 
concerning the relationship between church and government will address Bonhoeffer’s early 
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political thought as it is recorded in his 1933 essay “The Church and the Jewish Question.”  This 
somewhat infamous work is the first known record of Bonhoeffer’s public reactions to Nazi 
efforts to oppress the Jewish population within Germany.  More specifically, Bonhoeffer’s early 
political thought comes in response to Nazi incursions into the internal workings of German 
Protestant churches which included efforts to persecute and deny ethnically Jewish Christians 
from participating in such churches.  It is here that Bonhoeffer articulates an early rendition of 
his understanding of the divide between church and government, including responses the church 
may take against these unacceptable invasions from state authorities.   
 The second church and government chapter explores two final concerns of this thesis: 
Bonhoeffer’s political theology during the final years of his life, including the years of his 
participation in the German military intelligence wing’s (known as Abwehr) conspiracy, and the 
ethical implications of attempted tyrannicide given the Christological and ethical views 
expressed beforehand.  I attempt to describe how Bonhoeffer’s understanding of church and 
government evolved toward a more sophisticated appreciation for the complexity of church-
government relations during his later years, although his argument remains characteristically 
unsystematic.  He concludes that Nazi Germany had violated its mandated role as a governing 
authority through its efforts to infiltrate the German churches.  Worse, the Nazis had undone the 
fundamental role of government, to preserve the possibility of human beings having an openness 
toward the revelation of Christ, by persecuting its opponents and engaging in genocidal 
practices.  From Bonhoeffer’s perspective, there could be no reconciliation between the 
abhorrent practices of the Nazi state and the preservation of genuine Christian ethics in 
Germany.  His participation in the Abwehr assassination plot came as a result of his desire to end 
the war and participate in the restoration of his country when the crisis had subsided.   
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 Ultimately, the ethical problem posed by Bonhoeffer’s beliefs and actions is 
approachable if we understand his political theology to be grounded in faith.  From the 
conclusions drawn from his Christology and ethics, and given how these conclusions inform his 
political theory, I argue that Bonhoeffer’s self-analysis with respect to his actions depends on his 
understanding of the Christian need for forgiveness.  Commentators on Bonhoeffer have 
improperly categorized him as a pseudo-just war thinker during World War II, or have 
sometimes dismissed the possibility that Bonhoeffer is occasionally a contradictory figure.1  
However, my conclusion is that Bonhoeffer’s explicit appeal to Christian reliance on the 
forgiveness of God as a result of sin prevents him from offering clear ethical endorsement of his 
actions.  While Bonhoeffer expresses neither a desire to recant himself, nor a justification for his 
decisions, his final writings provide us with some insight into his dependence on the mercy of 
God in the midst of political action.  Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s belief in Jesus Christ as the center of 
all reality is the key to understanding how he viewed his involvement with the Abwehr 
conspiracy.  If reality exists for and through Christ, then Bonhoeffer’s ethical objections to 
Nazism and Adolph Hitler must also proceed from the Christo-centric nature of the Christian 
life.  While Bonhoeffer makes no appeals to moral or political laws, nature, or conscience, he 
acts against a tyrannical regime as a venture of faith.  This act of faith is not dependent on 
justification, but upon the forgiveness of God.   
 
 
                                                     
1 This view will be examined later in my thesis, particularly in regards to David M. Gides’ 
Pacifism, Just War, and Tyrannicide: Bonhoeffer's Church-World Theology and His Changing 
Forms of Political Thinking and Involvement (2011) and Kenneth Barnes’ essay entitled 
“Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hitler's Persecution of the Jews” (1999). 
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Source Material 
 I will be relying on several of Bonhoeffer’s works throughout this thesis, and primarily 
these are found in a recent seventeen volume series of translations known as the Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Collected Works (1996-2014) from Augsburg Fortress Press.  Internal citations of 
these manuscripts will abbreviate the title of each volume along with the pagination containing 
the quote (e.g. DBWE 16: 25).   Additionally, Bonhoeffer’s unfinished magnum opus, Ethics 
(2004), will serve as the primary text of this thesis.  The translation of Ethics I use is the same 
translation found in the collected works as volume six, translated by Reinhard Krauss, Charles 
West, and Douglas W. Stott.  Unlike the other volumes, however, internal citations of this work 
will simply record the title and page number (e.g. Ethics, 10) so as to clearly note for the reader 
when Bonhoeffer’s views come from this later work, as opposed to earlier or less important 
texts.  Similarly, Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers from Prison (1997) as collected by his friend 
and student, Eberhard Bethge, will be abbreviated (LPFP) rather than cited as part of the 
collected works.  Like Ethics, I will draw heavily from LPFP in the later chapters and wish to 
differentiate citations from it in order to be clear about the time and importance of the quotations 
selected.  Finally, some commentary will be included from The Bonhoeffer Reader (2013), edited 
by Clifford J. Green and Michael P. DeJonge and also published by Fortress Press.  This book 
contains selections from the collected works translations which are presented in compacted form.  
As with the collected works and Letters and Papers from Prison, I will abbreviate the title of the 
reader (DBR).
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BONHOEFFER’S CHRISTOLOGY 
“Ever since Jesus Christ said of himself ‘I am the Life’ (John 14:5; 11:25), no Christian thinking 
or indeed philosophical reflection can any longer ignore this claim and the reality it contains.”1 
 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer is frequently lauded by Christians from an array of traditions for his 
alleged civil and religious courage in the face of Nazism and the violence of the National 
Socialist regime.  Despite being claimed as a martyr for the sake of his Christian beliefs and 
concerns for his Jewish fellows, it is often forgotten that Bonhoeffer had also proved himself to 
be one of the most formidable Christian theologians of the early twentieth-century at the time of 
his death.  To understand the gravity of Bonhoeffer’s choices toward the end of his life, we must 
appreciate the depth of his intellectual involvement with the Christian faith.  I will argue in this 
thesis that Bonhoeffer’s actions flow from his theological beliefs.  His justifications and self-
awareness, while sometimes obscure and difficult to tease out, are always rooted in the core 
teaching of his theological beliefs: that the central focus of all existence is the person of Jesus 
Christ.  
In order to discuss how Bonhoeffer viewed his participation in attempted tyrannicide, it is 
valuable for us to know that Bonhoeffer understood the existence of both church and state as 
domains tasked with representing the will of God on Earth.  Furthermore, reality itself is oriented 
around the expression of God’s will through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  The 
foundation of Bonhoeffer’s theology and social thought is his Christology.  Therefore, all of 
Bonhoeffer’s writings and actions relevant to this thesis must be appreciated as consequences 
proceeding directly from his view of Christ as the center.     
                                                     
1 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, Fortress Press DBWE vol. 6 (2004); pp. 249 
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To summarize the essential components of this chapter, I will argue that Bonhoeffer’s 
Christology refers to the following claims: that Christ should be seen as a concrete and historical 
redeemer about whom the whole of reality is oriented.  Christ, or the God who became human, 
has lived an earthly life in order reconcile the gulf between God and human beings which has 
been created by godlessness, or what Christians have called sinfulness, the consequence of which 
is death.  Upon achieving this reconciliation (found in the Christian teachings of the cross and 
resurrection), God has authored “mandates” to preserve order and make the knowledge and 
experience of Christ continually open to human beings.  Nature, therefore, is defined by the 
affirmation of a reality centered around Christ, while what is unnatural rejects this reality.  
While it may seem digressive to place such importance on Bonhoeffer’s theological 
beliefs in a study of his political life, the foundational worldview which informs ethical or 
political decision-making should be fair game for a study of political theory.  I will argue in this 
thesis that Bonhoeffer is a Christian man making decisions which have politically relevant 
consequences.  Bonhoeffer’s Christian presuppositions have a direct influence on his teaching 
and self-awareness.  It is necessary to point out that Bonhoeffer does not begin with a politically 
motivated frame of mind, but from the perspective of a devout Pastor concerned with the 
suffering of others at the hands of his countrymen.  The central motivating force behind his real 
life actions, or at least as he is able to articulate such a force, is worth including in a serious 
exploration of his life.  Not to include Bonhoeffer’s Christology as the center-piece of his ethical 
and political thinking would be to betray the integrity of his actions and ignore his own words. 
Christ as the Center 
Bonhoeffer begins his Ethics with a chapter entitled “Christ, Reality and Good,” in which 
he dismisses the notion that Christian ethics can be addressed from the standpoint of the 
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individuated self, where the human mind asks “what is good?” or “how can I become good?” 
Instead, Christians must ask a radically different question: “what is the will of God?”  Of course, 
the presupposition behind this question is a reversal from the thought of many Moderns, for 
whom the focus of ethical concerns originates within the self.  Bonhoeffer is partially reviving an 
ancient claim that the truth of ethical concerns has its source independent of human capacities or 
artifice, though his views depart from the Classical Hellenists as well.  In order to discuss 
Christian “ethics,” Bonhoeffer believes we must dispense with the mistaken belief that the 
boundaries of ethics begin and end with the human being.  We must also abandon the mistaken 
equivocation between what is apparent to us from nature and what is revealed to us as the will of 
God.  To do so would be to think from the outset that the self and the world in which it lives are 
the focus of real life and everyday concerns.  He writes that “[t]he source of a Christian ethic is 
not the reality of one’s own self, not the reality of the world, nor is it the reality of norms and 
values. It is the reality of God that is revealed in Jesus Christ.”2  
What distinguishes this Christological view of reality from modern ethical theories is the 
placement of Christ directly at the center of life, from which all other concerns proceed.  All 
ethical concerns start from this fact and expand outward toward specific circumstances in human 
lives.  Bonhoeffer believes that we must not place the influence of God in our daily lives at the 
margins of existence, but at the center of all phenomena.  His view is that “Christ is [not only] 
the center and power of the Bible, of the church, of theology, but also of humanity, reason, 
justice, and culture.”3  
                                                     
2 Ibid 99 
3 Ibid 341 
 
 
10 
According to this view, the Western world has lost track of how to understand the 
‘presence of God with us’ by conceptualizing humanity and the world in the terms of Hugo 
Grotius: etsi deus non daretur (‘even if there were no God’).4  Bonhoeffer traces the 
development of this modern naturalism in a letter from Tegel prison to his student, friend, and 
eventual biographer Eberhard Bethge in July of 1944 where he identifies the “one great 
development that leads to the world’s autonomy” from a reality connected inseparably from 
God’s reality.  Here it is useful to let Bonhoeffer trace the key figures in this development in his 
own words.  He writes that: 
In theology one sees it first in Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who maintains that reason is 
sufficient for religious knowledge.  In ethics it appears in [Michel de] Montaigne and 
[Jean] Bodin with their substitution of rules of life for the commandments.  In politics 
[Niccolo] Machiavelli detaches politics from morality in general and founds the doctrine 
of ‘reasons of state.’  Later, and very differently from Machiavelli, but tending like him 
towards the autonomy of human society, comes Grotius, setting up his natural law and 
international law […].  The philosophers provide the finishing touches: on the one hand 
we have the deism of Descartes, who holds that the world is a mechanism, running by 
itself with no interference from God; and on the other hand the pantheism of Spinoza, 
who says that God is nature.  In the last resort, Kant is a deist, and Fichte and Hegel are 
pantheists.  Everywhere the thinking is directed toward the autonomy of man and the 
world.5  
Bonhoeffer sees a Western intellectual culture which has placed God and ethics outside 
of daily human life, at the margins of existence.  God is no longer conceived as the Hebraic 
Yahweh, a deity involved directly in the world’s affairs and concerned with the circumstances of 
real people, yet still above his creation.  Instead, Bonhoeffer worries that God has been viewed 
                                                     
4 This is Bonhoeffer’s shortened paraphrasing of Grotius’ language. (See. LPFP, 359).  
Wüstenberg notes in an essay compiled in “Bonhoeffer's Intellectual Formation: Theology and 
Philosophy in His Thought” (ed. Frick, Peter 2008) that Grotius’ actual statement from his 
Prolegomena reads as: etiamsi daremus, quod sine summon scelere dari nequid, non esse deum 
(“Even if we were to give – which cannot be done without great sacrilege – that there is no 
God”).   
5 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 359 
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as either a distant organizing force or something indistinguishable from the natural order itself.  
The modern West has demoted human life, including ethical concerns, to a world constructed 
purely by natural ends; self-contained and mechanistic.  As Gides notes, “[Bonhoeffer] creatively 
sought to formulate a Christian understanding of transcendence somewhere between the 
extremes of God’s total otherness and any equation of God and the world.  Bonhoeffer’s solution 
is a ‘this-worldly,’ ‘ethical,’ or ‘social’ transcendence rather than notions of transcendence that 
rely on traditional or continental philosophy or metaphysics.”6  Bonhoeffer wishes for us to 
visualize Christ as the centerpiece of all life concerns so that ethical and political choices must be 
related back toward Jesus in order to have significance.   
We can recall, as an example, in contrast to Bonhoeffer, the view of nature given to us by 
Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan as a clear example of this orientation toward an autonomous 
life and world.  The philosophical addition to modernity which Hobbes adds to the politics of 
human life are stated thusly: “For there is no such Finus ultimus (utmost aim) nor Summum 
Bonum (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old philosophers.”7  Rather than 
entertaining notions of the soul or a directedness toward ‘higher’ things as the ancients did, 
Hobbes writes that “when the words free and liberty are applied to anything but bodies, they are 
absurd.”8 
One cannot help but notice that Hobbes equates necessity in the world with the ‘will of 
God’ in these passages—there is no appeal to the Christian scriptures on ethical choices or a 
proper way to live; more importantly for Bonhoeffer, there is no Christ at the center.  The 
potential range of choices presented to us by Hobbes are contained exclusively within nature 
                                                     
6 Gides, 94 
7 Hobbes, Leviathan, 57 
8 Ibid 136 
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itself, as well as the ‘necessary’ consequences once those choices have been made.  They are 
never connected to any ‘higher’ form of moral thinking, nor are they teleologically directed 
toward any virtuous outcome.  They are within the world itself.  ‘Good’ political behavior in the 
Leviathan is constituted by explicitly and exclusively natural ends.  Bonhoeffer believes this kind 
of autonomous view of life and nature has obscured the reality of God’s revelation from the 
world.  Nature is self-sustaining and blind to any influence from the divine.  The only ‘good’ is 
what reason has illuminated for us from what is apparent in nature.  
For Bonhoeffer, when we imagine God as a working hypothesis placed at the boundaries 
of nature that fills in the void of mystery through the omnipotence of a secret hand, or some kind 
of cosmic interrupter who reaches down to mingle with the machinery of the world in occasional 
moments of punishment or reward, we push Christ to the margins and re-write the presentation 
of the Messiah found in the Gospels.  Bonhoeffer writes to Bethge that Christ “helps us not by 
virtue of his omnipotence, but by virtue of his weakness and suffering.”9  Thus, it is essential to 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology that we understand Jesus as the god become human—the concrete and 
historical life of Christ who gave up the power and majesty of a deity and became a human being 
in the flesh.  Furthermore, he did not come as a king over an earthly principality or as a 
conqueror of land and titles, but appeared instead as a Jewish teacher raised in Israel, and finally 
murdered at the hands of religious and political authorities.  According to Bonhoeffer scholar 
Clifford Green, “[t]his centrality of Christ is the core of Bonhoeffer’s ethic of one reality 
constituted by the reconciliation of the God who became human in Jesus Christ.” 10  
                                                     
9 LPFP, 360-361 
10 Ethics, Green, 5 
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Bonhoeffer’s God is not nature itself or some kind of cosmic and distant watch-maker; he is the 
good shepherd to a lost and rebellious flock.    
The Humanity of Christ in the World 
According to Gides, “Bonhoeffer presents what is essentially the same theological 
position in different ways to meet differing conditions, with respect to varying life contexts, or in 
terms of the genre in which he is writing.”11  Despite shifting ethical and theological views found 
in Bonhoeffer’s canon, all of these views proceed directly from an effort to comprehend the 
profound impact of Christ on human lives.  Bonhoeffer roots his religious, philosophical, ethical, 
and personal work in the essential Christian teaching of Emmanuel, the God who became human.  
But in order to follow the vocabulary adopted by Bonhoeffer in his Christological work, we must 
understand what Bonhoeffer means when he refers to the humanity of Christ and why it matters 
to the real daily life concerns of human beings. 
To begin, Bonhoeffer writes that “[t]he most fundamental reality is the reality of the God 
who became human.  This reality provides the ultimate foundation and the ultimate negation of 
everything that actually exists, its ultimate justification and ultimate contradiction.”12  Since God 
has taken it upon himself to become human, Bonhoeffer believes that human life is affirmed by 
the doctrine of Christ’s incarnation, and there is no need for humans to strive toward becoming 
divine themselves.  Instead, the very definition of humanity, or what being human is intended to 
mean, has now been defined for us by the incarnation of Christ as the God who lived a human 
life.  Bonhoeffer describes the importance of this incarnation as the moment in which the gulf 
between a godless world and its creator was bridged by the actions of that creator.   
                                                     
11 Gides, 11 
12 Ethics, 223 
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But Bonhoeffer’s view of the incarnation of Christ focuses on a narrative of Jesus which 
describes the Messiah as a king robed in the weakness of human flesh, as opposed to a gnostic 
event that raised humanity up to the divine level.  In relation to Jesus, Clifford Green notes that 
Bonhoeffer is consistently using the term Menchwerdung, “becoming human.”13  He writes that 
“God did not become an idea, a principle, a program, a universally valid belief, or a law; God 
became human.”14  Through the incarnation of Christ as a human being, Bonhoeffer is making a 
statement about how a humanity that had rejected God is now reformed and given reconciliation 
to God in Christ’s having affirmed and embodied the intended human life.  Now that Christ has 
redeemed the world, a new humanity restored by the grace of God and exemplified by Jesus is 
bursting forth in this world and this life.  Furthermore, and as Green goes on to explain, 
Bonhoeffer “reverses an ancient theological dictum […] that God became human in order that 
humans might become divine,” and replaces it with the view that Christ’s humanity makes true 
humanity possible – now human beings as they were intended are exemplified by Jesus 
himself.15  Therefore, because of Christ, a true and restored humanity is an emerging social and 
historical fact.  The incarnation of God having lived a human life has instated an ontological 
reality where the sinfulness articulated by the Christian doctrine of the Fall has been overcome 
and human beings are restored.    
Nature and the Four Divine Mandates 
Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the humanity of Christ is not a metaphysical claim about the 
substance of reality.  Bonhoeffer is not using this Christological view to refute materialism or 
take a stand on the arrangement of the human soul.  This is a teleological worldview which 
                                                     
13 Green notes that the root Mench means “human being,” as opposed to Mann or “man.”   
14 Ethics, 99 
15 Ethics, Green, 6 
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places Christ at the center of a universal narrative in which human beings are the recipients of 
God’s love.  Bonhoeffer writes that “[t]he world has no reality of its own independent from 
God’s revelation in Christ.  It is a denial of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ to wish to be 
‘Christian’ without being ‘worldly.’”16  Thus, it is difficult to justify a distinction between the 
natural and super-natural realms in Bonhoeffer’s thought.  Instead, God’s revelation of love 
through the concrete and historical life of Christ represents the embracing of human life.  What 
remains to be seen is the response of this world to that revelation.  How are we to view the 
natural in light of Bonhoeffer’s opposition to the mechanistic and self-sustaining view of nature 
expressed by his characterization of modernity? 
Everything in reality proceeds from the reality of Christ, or is rejected by it 
Bonhoeffer wishes to avoid eliminating a conception of ‘nature’ from his thought as he 
fears other Protestants have done,17 but he does not wish to re-hash Catholic notions of Natural 
Law or Natural Theology.  Instead, nature, or “the natural” in the DBWE translation, becomes 
about an experience of living for or against the reality of Christ.  
The connection between Bonhoeffer’s Christology and his conception of nature is found 
in his teaching on what he calls the four divine mandates.  The key point in Bonhoeffer’s 
Christology is God becoming human, and thus placing the focus of Christian living on this life, 
and the revelation of Jesus Christ in the concrete world.  The core elements of human life which 
Bonhoeffer believes have been situated by God to direct human life toward him, called 
“mandates” by Bonhoeffer, pivot directly on the centrality of Jesus to all things.  He writes that 
“[t]his relation of the world to Christ becomes concrete in certain mandates of God in the world. 
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The scripture names four such mandates: work, marriage, government, and church.”18 19  By 
living within the context of these four demarcations of human life, humans are given the 
opportunity to have lives which affirm or deny the work of God through Jesus Christ.  The 
natural is described by Bonhoeffer as “that which, after the fall, is directed toward the coming of 
Jesus Christ.  The unnatural is that which, after the fall, closes itself from the coming of 
Christ.”20  
Human freedom thus emerges as a result of this rejection of God.  The fall from creation 
into nature introduces the possibility of freedom: the freedom to direct oneself toward the reality 
of God or not.  Bonhoeffer’s ‘mandates’ are formulated from his interpretation of the New 
Testament’s means of keeping the possibility of following God open to human beings, despite 
their preference for godlessness.  According to Bonhoeffer’s description, “we speak of the 
natural as distinct from the created in order to include the fact of the fall into sin.”21  The 
introduction of godlessness into creation that is presented in Genesis 2 represents, for 
Bonhoeffer, the transformation from the world as ‘creation’ to something which accounts for a 
reality now plagued by the possibility of human rejections of God, i.e. of sin.  
Again, it is important for us to distinguish Bonhoeffer’s terminology (i.e. nature) from 
what might be confused as statements about the material world, or the physics of material things. 
“The natural is that form of life preserved by God for the fallen world that is directed toward 
                                                     
18 So as not to veer off topic here, I will return to the references to biblical scripture in more 
detail in the sections devoted to Bonhoeffer’s church and government relations.  His exposition 
on passages concerning marriage and work are beyond the scope of this project.  It is also 
pertinent to note that the mandates translated as “marriage” and “work” in vol. 16 of DBWE are 
frequently translated as “family” and “culture” respectively. 
19 Ethics, 68 
20 Ibid. 173 
21 Ibid.  
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justification, salvation, and renewal through Christ”22  Nature in Bonhoeffer’s thinking is 
broader, encompassing all real dynamics of what exists within the human experience with the 
possibility of being ‘natural’ or ‘open’ to the revelation of Christ, as opposed to ‘unnatural’ and 
‘closed’ toward Christ.  
It is also important to remember that the mandates (marriage, work, government, and 
church) are connected to the natural in the sense that they are God’s means of preserving the 
possibility of being oriented toward or open to the reality of Christ.  Green and DeJonge note that 
this conception of the mandates is a departure from the Lutheran conception of creation ‘orders,’ 
and a direct challenge to Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran contemporaries who had adopted the Volk 
(people, nation, or race) as an additional ‘order’ of creation.  Bonhoeffer is hesitant to use the 
term “order” for fear of suggesting that the mandates are solely focused on a static element of 
human life.  “This,” he says, “then leads all too easily to a divine sanctioning of all existing 
orders per se, and thus to a romantic conservatism that no longer has anything to do with the 
Christian doctrine of the four mandates.”23  To focus too strongly on the permanence of the 
authorization of the mandates by God, rather than the actual sanctioning granted by God, risks 
confusing a present state of affairs with the role of the mandates to preserve Christ’s presence 
within human experience.  The presence of these mandates in human life should not lead us to 
believe that they are sources of truth in and of themselves simply because they hold a permanent 
place in human life.  Indeed, as some commentators have written of Bonhoeffer, “there [in the 
mandates] he rejects the idea that God’s will could be read directly from nature or history; fallen 
creation can be rightly understood only in the relationship to Christ”24  
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In order to clarify the role of the mandates in human life and tie them to the 
Christological view of living a ‘natural’ life, Bonhoeffer defines the mandates thusly: “by 
‘mandate’ we understand the concrete divine commission grounded in the revelation of Christ 
and the testimony of scripture; it is the authorization and legitimization to declare a particular 
divine commandment, the conferring of divine authority on an earthly institution.”25  The 
authority of these divine commandments, mandates, depends on the importance, sanctioning, 
authorship, of them as the commandment of God made real through Jesus Christ.  They preserve 
the human experience of God’s expression of the love for the world through Christ.  So, to be 
natural is to affirm the reality of God’s love for human beings.  This expression of God’s love, 
called a revelation, becomes historically real as Christ and is preserved in human experience 
through the four mandates.  To live a ‘natural life’ is to experience the reality of God’s love for 
human beings as God chose to express that love in the reality Christ, and we see the preserved 
representatives of that love in this life through the mandates which have been issued by God for 
that purpose. “The divine mandates depend solely on God’s one commandment as it is revealed 
in Jesus Christ.”26  In other words, the mandates embrace the whole of human experience just as 
Christ himself does by becoming human. 
So, when Bonhoeffer refers to natural life, he is talking about being open to Christ in the 
context of human experience.  On why the mandates of creation are related to human experience 
he writes: “God’s commandment therefore always seeks to encounter human beings within 
earthly relationship of authority.”27  In Bonhoeffer’s view, God has authorized four earthly 
mandates of human life to be institutions which the truth of Christ is preserved for the world.  
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These mandates, derived from the text of biblical scripture, are tasked with orienting human lives 
toward the revelation of Christ.  To affirm this reality by living a life devoted to Christ as 
described by scripture is to live a ‘natural’ life; that is, a life which reflects the fact that all of 
reality is created by God for and through Christ.  
 Given that human beings are granted the possibility of experiencing God through the 
revelation of Christ within the context of the four mandates, it remains to be seen how Christians 
are to apply this view of natural life to the world around them.  Or, to place the implications of 
this Christological center directly into the concerns of Bonhoeffer’s political actions, it remains 
to be seen how the topic of ethics arises from his theological views.  The general background of 
Bonhoeffer’s thinking on theology are essential to understanding his ethics and the intellectual 
framework of his involvement with the Abwehr conspiracy.
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BONHOEFFER’S ETHICS 
“Instead they must ask a wholly other, completely different question: what is the will of God? 
This demand is radical precisely because it presupposes a decision about ultimate reality, that is, 
a decision of faith.”1 
 
The topic of Christian ethics, given the centrality of Jesus Christ to all things, must be 
appreciated from that vantage point.  In this section, I will explore Bonhoeffer’s commentary on 
ethics in which he grounds all moral thought in the Christological center of reality.  For 
Bonhoeffer, if there is to be any discussion among Christians on ethics at all, the starting place 
must be the implications of Jesus Christ for daily life.  Universally valid systems of ethical 
principles which have been manufactured by Western thinkers of all stripes are ultimately hollow 
because “systematic construction of metaphysical deduction paralyzes real life.”2  Ethics have to 
be “authorized,” and this authorization occurs only under the expression of God’s will.  
Identifying and following the will of God in one’s historical situation is the ethical position 
Bonhoeffer prefers, not classical or modern ethical thinking.  This section will examine these 
ethical claims in more detail, as well as lay the groundwork for the forthcoming sections on 
church and government. 
Among all of Bonhoeffer’s works, none contains more substance on the subject of the 
ethical than his appropriately entitled, though unfinished work, Ethics.  I have relied on this work 
frequently in the previous pages and will continue to use it as the central source for Bonhoeffer’s 
thought in this chapter.  Within Ethics, I will rely primarily on three sections entitled, “Christ, 
Reality, and Good,” “Ethics as Formation,” and “The ‘Ethical’ and the ‘Christian’ as a Topic.”  
The use of these selections for the purpose of my thesis will be to demonstrate that Bonhoeffer 
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integrates his Christological views into the question of ethical life to the point that he, in many 
ways, alienates himself from many traditionally Western visions of ethics.  
The difficulty Bonhoeffer finds in even approaching the question of a Christian ethic is 
that he believes we must abandon the questions which have prompted many to examine the topic 
at all.  Those of us who are interested in Christian ethics must give up “the very two questions 
that led them to deal with the ethical problem: ‘How can I be good?’ and ‘How do I do 
something good?’3  To include these questions as the starting places for taking up Christian 
ethics would be to violate the Christological center described in the previous section because 
doing so would be to place the root of the ethical at the level of human beings, grammatically 
focusing ethical inquiry on the subjective “I,” not through and for Christ.  If Christians are able 
to take up the topic of ethics at all, they must begin by affirming the centrality of Christ.  For this 
reason, we might say that Bonhoeffer throws out the possibility of virtue, normative, and 
consequentialist variations of ethical thought from the start, but this will be explored more 
thoroughly later.   
This portion of Bonhoeffer’s thinking from the Ethics begins with the claim that human 
experience suggests to us that community is always in a state of disintegration.  The question of 
the ought enters our experience when humans become aware of the self-restraint placed upon us 
by entering into communities and resigning ourselves to the constraints of human interactions.  
As Bonhoeffer explains, “[o]nly where the community disintegrates or where the order is 
endangered does the ought raise its voice, only to recede and fall silent again, once the order has 
been restored.”4  However, concrete communities are always, in some sense, decaying for one 
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reason or another.  Bonhoeffer calls this entropy a secular analogy to the doctrine of original sin.  
The consequences of godlessness in the world have a negative effect on the sustainability of 
human community.  Bonhoeffer does not believe that human communities can be perfected by 
more Christian “righteousness” because God himself has endured rejection as a result of the 
human sinfulness in which both Christians and non-believers engage.  Bonhoeffer takes the 
standard Reformation view of the doctrine of the Fall here.  Bonhoeffer believes that whenever 
the ethical is taken up as a ‘topic,’ it becomes something discussed and deliberated until someone 
arrives at a ‘method’ or ‘rubric’ of behavior.  When these discussions go too long, beyond the 
“emergencies” that prompt them, the ultimate question of the ought is “replaced by a flat-footed 
moralizing and a homespun pedagogical approach to all of life.”5  To allow our ethical theorizing 
to go on and on is to retreat from daily life, risking disastrous results.  For the Christian to treat 
the ethical as a topic is to risk, ironically, undermining the benefit to daily life which was sought 
in the first place.  
But so far Bonhoeffer’s views are unclear.  After all, what does Bonhoeffer say ethics 
actually are, and what does an ethicist do to comprehend them?  It is clear that he is adamant 
about the importance of daily life -- time and place – when he rejects ethics conceived as “a 
reference manual that guarantees flawless moral behavior.”6  This daily living – the tasks and 
processes of life—are not universals, he says, but are characterized by and made apparent by the 
concrete circumstances of one’s life.  Bonhoeffer sets up his point about the time-place character 
of the ethical this way: 
[…] it is the folly of ethicists to overlook this fact willfully and to start from the fictional 
assumption that human beings at every moment of their lives have to make an ultimate, 
infinite choice; as if every moment of life would require a conscious decision between 
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good and evil; as if every human action were to be labeled with a sign, written by divine 
police in bold letters, saying ‘Permitted’ or ‘Prohibited;’ as if human beings incessantly 
had to do something decisive, fulfill a higher purpose, meet an ultimate duty.  This 
attitude is a misjudgment of historical human existence which everything has its time 
(Ecc. 3).7 8  
In order to approach this question about the ethical in time and place, as opposed to a 
principle or rule which is appealed to at all times and all places, we must tackle what Bonhoeffer 
calls the requirement for “concrete authorization.” 
Authorization  
The ethics of time and place are ‘concrete’ by being limited (or constrained) by the bonds 
and circumstances we are exposed to by participating in mutual relationships.  In Bonhoeffer’s 
words, these relationships “inherently [involve] a certain order of human community and entails 
certain sociological relationships of authority.”9  The reverse approach, which is to treat the 
ethical merely as a topic to contemplate in the pursuit of universal principles, has the effect of 
atomizing individuals away from one another and erodes the health of communities since the 
ethical relation is no longer tied to the specific relationships and circumstances of one’s life, but 
to abstractions which are ‘out there’ -- not directly experienced by interacting with other people. 
As Bonhoeffer explains, “It is at least highly questionable whether isolated individuals, divorced 
from their historical situation and their historical bonds can be considered as a relevant ethical 
                                                     
7 See Ecclesiastes 3:1-8 “For there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven: a time 
to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted; a time to 
kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up; a time to weep, and a time 
to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance; a time to throw away stones, and a time to gather 
stones together; a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing; a time to seek, and a 
time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to throw away; a time to tear, and a time to sew; a time to 
keep silence, and a time to speak; a time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time for 
peace.” NRSV 
8 Ethics, 365 
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agent at all.”10  These concrete relationships are no longer authoritative in informing ethical 
decision-making, but merely provide us with reference points from which we measure our status 
according to universal principles.  Bonhoeffer fears this is making ethical choices on the basis of 
abstractions, not for the sake of others.  
How then would Bonhoeffer have us think of the ethical?  He realizes that these claims 
lead him to confront an unavoidable question: “what is the basis of the concrete authorization for 
ethical discourse?”11  To begin his answer, he presents two alternative approaches, both of which 
he claims are problematic: 
Two answers come to mind: either the authorization for ethical discourse is found 
positivistically in existing reality without any further attempt to interpret it, or one creates 
a system of orders and values within which authorization is ascribed to the parent, the 
master, the government.12  
Bonhoeffer argues that grounding the authorization for ethical discourse in positivism, or from 
what is “given” in reality as we understand it, is limited by the fact that because we can only 
speculate based upon what is apparent to our knowledge and understanding at the present 
historical moment, the authorization would therefore be bound to change as our knowledge and 
understanding changes.  If the authority of the ethical is derived from our apprehension of facts 
and speculations about reality, Bonhoeffer believes that changes in our knowledge and capacities 
will necessarily change our apprehension of what is “given.”  To universalize what appears to be 
given in reality risks creating a permanence of antiquated or false information.  These 
vulnerabilities make the positivist option nearly impotent in defining the boundaries between the 
mandates of government, church, family, and work.  The authorization of these elements of 
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human experience cannot depend on something as capricious as human understandings of what 
is ‘given’ in reality.  They must be authorized by something else.   
What is more, we can observe Bonhoeffer’s tendency to reject rationalism or a strict 
adherence to the Western logical tradition as early as 1934 when, in giving a lecture on the 
theology of Karl Barth and the situation for German churches, he suggests that the incarnation of 
Christ defies the Aristotelian principle of identity (i.e. A=A) and its tandem principle of non-
contradiction.13  Continuing his disapproval of rationalism later in Ethics, he writes that 
“[w]henever, in the face of the deification of the irrational powers of blood, of instinct, of the 
predator within human beings, there was an appeal to reason.”14  Humans, Christian or 
otherwise, routinely and historically commit an error when we place reason on a high pedestal of 
epistemological justification.  Bonhoeffer seems to believe, as a matter of historical observation, 
that the horrors of human ethical behavior have nearly always been sanctioned by appeals to 
human reason.  Principles which are generally valid through either the access of unified human 
reason or historical experience will always raise the challenge of making the timeless into 
something temporal.  Turning the abstract generally valid authority into the concrete and 
contextualized.  Bonhoeffer says this would no longer be God’s commandment, but accessed by 
and subject to human understanding, interpretations, and applications. 
On the other hand, Bonhoeffer’s second answer to the question posed above (“what is the 
basis of the concrete authorization for ethical discourse?”), a system of values and orders, is also 
limited.  This second option is a system of values and orders within human life which, in the 
course of experiencing daily concerns, receives its authorization directly from governments, 
                                                     
13 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1005b “It is impossible for the same thing both to belong and not to 
belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.”  
14 Ethics, 340 
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parents, employers, or clergy members.  In this system, the values and orders established by the 
figure-heads within the mandates are taken as “direct manifestations of divine will, which 
[demand] submission.”15  The difficulty here, Bonhoeffer claims, is the seemingly arbitrary 
selection or delineation of the boundaries of authorization and authorities.  In fact, Bonhoeffer 
believes that “the empirical positivism is replaced here by a metaphysical-religious positivism” 
where the authorization of ethical discourse is simply extended past empirical knowledge to the 
speculative and arbitrary choice of one particular mandate as the source of authority, as opposed 
to the others.16  This approach offers us no valid means of understanding the boundaries between 
which elements of daily life are contained within the authority of government as opposed to 
church, family, or work.  The selection of one mandate as authoritative over the others is 
ultimately an arbitrary choice.   
So, the question posed by Bonhoeffer still stands: what is the basis of the concrete 
authorization for ethical discourse if we cannot derive it from the knowledge given in empirical 
investigation or from the sociological orders and values chosen by a mandated figure-head?  
What gives the questions of the ought any meaning if rational contemplation, the state, and even 
the church are insufficient to authorize the ethical?  He begins by arguing that “[w]e are thus led 
beyond the ‘ethical’ to the only possible subject matter of a ‘Christian ethic,’ namely, the 
‘commandment of God.’” 17  Here we receive the pastor’s decisive claim that “the commandment 
is the sole authorization for ethical discourse.”18  
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Bonhoeffer defines the commandment as “the total and concrete claim of human beings 
by the merciful and holy God in Jesus Christ.” 19  This pivotal clarification of the grounding of 
authority is where Bonhoeffer combines the importance of the mandates with the time and place 
restrictions of concrete ethical life.  As mentioned before in the previous chapter, the divine 
mandates are tasked with preserving the truth of God as it was expressed through Christ.  
Bonhoeffer cannot accept that Christians can come to know the will of God through principles or 
worldly orders since, he argues, “the concreteness of the divine commandment consists in its 
historicity; it encounters us in historical form.”20  The will of God is offered to human beings 
through “the commandment of God revealed in Jesus Christ [and] is addressed to us in church, in 
the family, in work, and in government.”21  Through these mandates, God has made it possible 
for generations of Christians to realize that God has laid claim to what it means to be human 
through the life of Christ.  By becoming human, God has taken ownership of everything that is 
the human experience.  He taught and affirmed the good, the ‘natural’ life, while overcoming the 
bad via the Passion: Christ’s death and resurrection.22  
The role of the mandates is to offer the possibility of encountering the reality and 
character of God through Christ.  In the church, knowledge of God and his revelation is taught 
and expressed through the church-community devoted to teaching the scriptures.  Every time a 
spouse or parent shows love to a family member by putting the other’s needs above their own, 
                                                     
19 Ibid  
20 Ibid 379 
21 Ibid 380 
22 “God’s commandment allows human beings to be human before God.  It lets the flow of life 
take its course, lets human beings eat, drink, sleep, work, celebrate, and play without interrupting 
those activities, without ceaselessly confronting them with the question whether that were 
actually permitted to sleep, eat, work, and play, or whether they did not have more urgent 
duties.” Ethics, 384-385  
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they mirror God’s love for human beings by acting according to his image.  Human work, or 
vocation—our engagement with the broader culture surrounding us—offers the chance to 
exercise creativity and recognize contributions to one’s neighbors and enemies alike.  And, in 
service to the authority of government, Christians imitate the humble servitude of Jesus himself 
by respecting the power established above them.  As Bonhoeffer explains, “I honor my parents, 
keep my marriage vows, and respect the life and property of others not because of menacing 
‘You Shall Not’ at the boundaries of my life, but because I myself affirm the given realities of 
parents, marriage, life, and property that I find in the center and fullness of life as God’s holy 
institution.”23  The question of ethics in Bonhoeffer’s corpus begins and ends with the will of 
God as filtered through experiencing the importance of Jesus Christ to the world. 
Consistent again with his Christology, this means that the basis of our ethical discourse, 
or how the presence of the ought becomes apparent to us, originates from beyond the appearance 
of the ethical in the material world as we apprehend it.  As Bonhoeffer clarifies, “[t]he 
commandment of God is not, in distinction from the ethical, the most general summation of all 
ethical rules.  It is not timeless and generally valid as opposed to being historical and 
temporal.”24  The question of God’s will is established by God himself and is given to us through 
the mandates which are tasked with preserving the reality and consequences of Christ in our 
world.  The commandment “is always a concrete speaking to someone, and never an abstract 
speaking about something or someone.”25  We encounter the commandment of God through the 
real world: we are spoken to through creation, others, nature, events, etc.26  
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  This does not mean, however, that the will of God is going to be readily apparent to 
human beings simply because the mandates are tasked with this exposure.  Bonhoeffer’s claim is 
that the commandment and reality of God is steadily made known to human beings through 
innumerable situations and events contained within the context of the divine mandates and their 
presence in our daily lives.  The commandment will never be universally available to the 
Christian at once or in a single moment since people are exposed to it according to the historical 
time and place circumstances of individual human lives.  No single moment of experience can 
reveal the totality of the ought for every ethical question of human life.  Our awareness of the 
commandment of God can only encounter human beings in the lives they actually live.  
 The central argument found here is that through God’s graciousness toward human 
beings, the reality and accomplishments of God’s love, made concrete through the life of Christ, 
are now bestowed on human life through daily historical experiences within the umbrella context 
of the divine mandates.  God’s ‘will’ for the Christian life can be delivered through the mundane 
encounters we experience every day without being conditioned upon their universality.  
Bonhoeffer goes on to clarify that “[t]he guilt we must acknowledge is not the occasional 
mistake or going astray, not the breaking of an abstract law, but falling away from Christ, from 
the form of the One who would take form in us and lead us to our own true form.”27  Thus, 
humanity writ large has been redeemed by Jesus having taken on human form and, through 
God’s institution of the mandates, now has the possibility of conforming to the true form of 
human life exemplified by Christ. 
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To give a concrete example, Bonhoeffer explains that in contrast to the strict moralism he 
fears will result from the ‘orders and values’ approach to authorization mentioned above, that 
within the divinely mandated context of marriage: 
The divine prohibition of adultery is then no longer the focal point of all I think and do in 
my marriage – as if the meaning and purpose of marriage consisted in avoiding adultery! 
Rather, marriage is kept and freely affirmed, which means moving beyond the prohibition 
of adultery, is actually the prerequisite for fulfilling the divine commission of marriage. 
Here the divine commandment has become permission to live married life freely and 
confidently.28 
Put another way, “It is not Christ who has to justify himself before the world by acknowledging 
the values of justice, truth, and freedom.  Instead, it is these values that find themselves in need 
of justification, and their justification is Jesus Christ alone.”29  In this statement Bonhoeffer again 
expresses that the grounding of all reality is ultimately found in Christ and is not subject to 
worldly artifice or human judgments.  Not in an ambiguous divine grounding of values, but 
through Jesus himself.  Furthermore, the burden is not on Christian defenders to establish the 
ethical legitimacy of Christ according to the criteria of values and principles held by anyone.  To 
do so would be to mistakenly start from the view that the moral legitimacy of Christ was 
established by his agreement with those values and principles.  Bonhoeffer turns this view 
upside-down: ethics do not justify Christ; Christ embodies the loving commandment of God.  
Justice, truth, and freedom find their affirmation in the crucified Christ and cannot be rightly 
invoked apart from their being oriented for him, but only experienced by human beings in the 
midst of their encounters within the movement of history.   
Given this, does Bonhoeffer fit into the three paradigmatic schools of ethical philosophy?  
Is he advocating some variation of deontological, consequentialist, or virtue ethics?  Certainly 
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not cleanly or clearly.  Not at all if Bonhoeffer truly believes that the central ethical question 
posed to the Christian life is “what is the will of God?” or that this will is expressed through the 
person of Christ, then preserved as revelation in history.  Instead, [t]he question of good must not 
be narrowed to investigating the relation of actions to their motives, or to their consequences, 
measuring them by a ready-made ethical standard.”30  The root of the ethical decision cannot 
become about being a certain sort of person, adhering to certain abstract principles, or pursuing 
alternatives for the sake of their outcome alone.  Under these circumstances, “[t]he 
commandment of God would again have become our own choice” rather than instated from 
above.31  Bonhoeffer’s ethics consist of choices of faith, the validity of which are measured only 
against the ultimate reality of God and Christ in the world.  Ethics are not about being anything; 
they are about setting aside oneself and following the resurrected Christ. 
 The connection between the Christological and the ethical comes through when 
Bonhoeffer argues that only through the reconciliation of a world in naked rebellion against God 
can the problems of real life be overcome.  He writes that “[n]ot ideals or programs, not 
conscience, duty, responsibility, or virtue, but only the consummate love of God can meet and 
overcome reality.”32  The Christological center of this ethical life is clear when Bonhoeffer 
explains that “[t]he world will be overcome not by destruction but by reconciliation.  Not ideals 
or programs, not conscience, duty, responsibility, or virtue, but only the consummate love of 
God can meet and overcome reality.”33  This declaration is Bonhoeffer’s resolute answer to the 
problem of death.  The inescapable and horrible consequence of his real life choices is the 
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possibility of death, in the same way that a world in naked rebellion against God leads to death.  
If Hitler does not die in the assassination attempt, Bonhoeffer’s life is certainly in danger.  
Furthermore, the lives of many of his friends and loved ones also involved in the resistance are at 
risk.  But to overcome that death is to follow the one who reconciled the world to himself34 in 
reliance on God’s expression of mercy and love through Christ.  Only by responding ‘Yes’ to the 
reality of Christ can Bonhoeffer escape the ‘death’ tied to his participation in the Abwehr plot 
since, through God alone, this death has been defeated.  
Conclusions 
 With these Christological and ethical views in mind, it now becomes appropriate to shift 
toward an investigation of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of church and government, as well as 
how his views inform the political actions of his own life.  To this point, I have argued that 
Bonhoeffer’s Christological focus prevents him from accepting any basis for human 
understandings of the ought apart from the redemption of humanity through Jesus Christ.  
Because God himself has taken on the human experience and, in so doing, bridged the divide 
between him and the godlessness of the world, Bonhoeffer argues that the historically real 
existence of Jesus has instituted a new status quo of reconciliation between God and humans.  
This revelation is now taught and preserved within the four mandates.  The commandment of 
God—expressed in history as Christ and persevered through the mandates—is renewed 
humanity.  God’s ‘will’ is, therefore, a perfected humanity presented by God himself as an act of 
grace, the knowledge and experience of which is unveiled through the natural events and 
interactions of time and place.  To Bonhoeffer, the ethicist who confuses this commandment with 
                                                     
34 On this point Bonhoeffer quotes from John 16:33 “I have said this to you, so that in me you 
may have peace.  In the world you face persecution.  But take courage; I have conquered the 
world!” NRSV 
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universal principles, pursuits of virtue, or obedience to earthly authorities is a tragi-comic figure; 
a misjudger.  Such a person has confused the person of Jesus with immanent phenomena or 
speculations.  To follow the latter and not the former is the core ethical misunderstanding of the 
Christian West and, for Bonhoeffer, the dangerous basis of the approach to political life taken up 
by his German contemporaries.    
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CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT: I 
Given the conclusions of the two chapters at the beginning of this thesis concerning the 
role of Bonhoeffer’s Christology in informing his view of ethical life, I will now move on to the 
implications of these views for Bonhoeffer’s understanding of church and government.  The third 
and fourth chapters on church-government relations will address two periods of Bonhoeffer’s 
thought: chapter three (entitled Church and Government I) will examine Bonhoeffer’s earliest 
articulation of what may be considered a theory of politics.  The primary text for this chapter, 
Bonhoeffer’s 1933 sermon entitled “The Church and the Jewish Question,” is developed in 
response to Nazi incursions into the practices of the German Evangelical churches.  In it, we find 
a tripartite formulation of responses which the church can exercise toward the actions of a state.  
These responses come in three phases: questioning of the state, assisting the victims of the state, 
and direct resistance against the state.  Church and Government: I addresses Bonhoeffer’s 
opposition to Nazi infiltrations into the churches and explores the first two phases of the tripartite 
church-government relation mentioned above.  The final chapter (Church and Government: II) 
will focus on the third phase of resistance toward government and whether or not Bonhoeffer’s 
actions are consistent with the later political thought he articulates in Ethics, Letters and Papers 
from Prison, and his “Theological Position Paper on Church and State.”  Chapter four will also 
focus on the question of sin and how Bonhoeffer either justifies of condemns his participation in 
the Abwehr resistance on the basis of his aforementioned political theology.   
Bonhoeffer and the “Jewish Question” 
Bonhoeffer is very vocal in his protection of Jewish persons both before and during the 
war.  Speaking in defense of the German Jewish population was more than a simple matter of 
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concern for others, however.  Bonhoeffer’s interest in the so-called “Jewish Question”1 was 
rooted, like so much of his thinking, in the inseparable connection between Christ and the world.  
The German persecution of Jews was not only inexcusable on grounds of Christian care for 
suffering people, but also because the Jewish heritage of the Christian faith cannot be ignored. 
To abuse the Jews was to abuse the historical lineage of the German people’s own religious 
identity.   
The German Church Struggle (Kirchenkampf) “was the conflict between those who 
attempted the nazification of the ethos, beliefs, and principles of governance of the German 
Protestant churches and those, such as Bonhoeffer, who resisted these attempts.”2  An effort to 
infuse Nazi ideology and radical German nationalism into the churches was underway as early as 
the late 1920’s.  Led by the Faith Movement of German Christians (referred to as simply 
“German Christians” [Deutche Christen]), these attempts to solidify right-wing radicalism within 
the Protestant churches reached a peak in January of 1933 when Adolph Hitler became the Reich 
Chancellor of Germany.  In his introductory remarks to Bonhoeffer’s collected works (during the 
1933-1935 period of Bonhoeffer’s residence in London), Clements notes that Bonhoeffer had 
engaged in fierce theological disagreement with the German Christians over the inclusion of 
concepts like “nation, race, and people (Volk) [as] fundamental items of Christian belief.”3  
Rooted again in his Christological views, Bonhoeffer vehemently opposed attempts to establish 
                                                     
1 It is perhaps important to remember that the “Jewish Problem,” as it was often termed, was a 
continental debate in Europe that had raged since before the time of Martin Luther.  While 
modern readers might rightly sense the anti-Semitic undertones of the terms involved (I.e. a so-
called Jewish “Question”), Bonhoeffer is choosing a softer noun than many Germans at the time 
adopted.  By contrast, Adolph Hitler’s “Final Solution” was coined in response to the blatantly 
racist Jewish “Problem.”  
2DBWE 13: Clements, 3 
3 Ibid 
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these concepts as fundamental orders of human existence, dismissing any logic which argued 
that the “purity” of race or Volk could replace Christ as the center.  
A long-held desire of the divided Evangelical4 churches before the rise of Nazism had 
been to establish a more unified organization of German Protestants, most of whom preached 
Lutheran doctrines.  While this conviction may have arisen with noble intentions, Clements and 
Bonhoeffer both note that it made the churches susceptible to manipulation.  Reflecting upon this 
fact in his letters from Tegel prison, Bonhoeffer writes that the submissive tendencies of German 
Lutheranism toward the state led to a civic vulnerability.  He writes “[b]ut in this [the German] 
misjudged the world; he did not realize that his submissiveness and self-sacrifice could be 
exploited for evil ends.”5  
In the summer of 1933, Hitler appointed Ludwig Müller, a former Chaplain in the 
German navy and strident member of the Nazi Party, as the official government liaison to the 
Protestant churches and tasked him with ensuring the unification of the German churches into 
one official Reich Church.  The introduction of the so-called “Aryan Paragraph” by Müller and 
the German Christians into the institutional regulations of the German Evangelical Church had 
transformed the formerly unconnected German Protestant churches into a single organization 
dominated by Nazi influence and subservient to the regime’s civil codes of conduct.  As a 
consequence, church members of “’non-Aryan’ (i.e. Jewish) descent would be banned from 
ministry and other church positions.”6  The Confessing Church, within which Bonhoeffer was a 
                                                     
4 Clements notes that, in translation, “’Evangelical’ (Evangelisch) in the German context 
generally means ‘Protestant’ as distinct from ‘Catholic’ rather than a certain type of 
Protestantism, as in some parts of the English-speaking world” (DBWE 13:14).  Where the term 
“Evangelical” is used in my thesis, it will reflect this translation unless otherwise stated.  
5DBWE 13: Clements, 4; LPFP, 6  
6 Ibid. Clements.  
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prominent figure, arose in opposition to these events.  “The Barmen Declaration,” written by 
Bonhoeffer’s colleague and former teacher Karl Barth, contended that the state’s intrusions into 
the churches were unacceptable and that Christ himself, not the Füher, was the only rightful head 
of the church.  Despite this public form of resistance offered by the Confessing Church, the 
declaration made no mention of the persecuted Jews within Germany.   
Bonhoeffer’s heavily scrutinized  (see footnote eight of this page) 1933 essay entitled 
“The Church and the Jewish Question”7 was written as a direct response to these developments 
within the German Evangelical Church, with particular interest shown in responding to the 
persecution of Jews and Jewish Christians.  Since the document was written in response to the 
aftermath of the Aryan Paragraph, Bonhoeffer’s controversial comments here are best interpreted 
within the context of the problem raised: that is, baptized Christians of Jewish ethnic heritage 
were now being prohibited from participation in the churches.  As a consequence, the majority of 
Bonhoeffer’s essay is a criticism of the exclusion of Jewish Christians from the Christian 
community, not a comprehensive response to Jewish persecution.  His troublesome quotation of 
Martin Luther’s comments on the punishment of Jewish people is often regarded as a moment of 
anti-Semitism by observers.8  As we shall see from Bonhoeffer’s claims in later documents, 
however, this problem appears to have dissipated in the theologian’s later years.  
In “The Church and the Jewish Question,” we see a relatively young Bonhoeffer 
attempting to address political infringements upon the German churches.  According to my 
                                                     
7 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. 2009. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 12. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press. 
8 Barnes cites three such critics: William Jay Peck, “From Cain to the Death Camps: Bonhoeffer 
and Judaism,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 28 (Winter 1973): 158-76; Ruth Zerner, 
“Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Jews: Thoughts and Actions, 1933-1945,” Jewish Social Studies 37 
(1975): 235-250; and Stanley N. Rosenbaum, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Jewish View,” Journal of 
Ecumenical Studies 18 (Spring 1981): 301-7.    
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opinion only, this document represents the thought of a younger Bonhoeffer who had not yet 
faced the prolonged atrocities of the Nazi regime.  His commentary here is an admirable effort in 
reconciling his Christian beliefs with the suffering of the Jews within Germany’s realm of 
influence.  “The Church and the Jewish Question” by no means represents Bonhoeffer’s most 
sophisticated commentary on political theory, nor is it to be connected too closely with his later 
decision to participate in the Abwehr resistance.  While the implications of this essay set the 
stage for more serious political considerations later, it is primarily Bonhoeffer’s public reaction 
to the crisis within the context of the churches.  
 For the purposes of my argument here, “The Church and the Jewish Question” will serve 
as a starting place for many of the themes and questions involved with Bonhoeffer’s view of 
church and government, as well as the pressing ethical problem of tyrannicide.  He begins by 
describing two problems posed to the church by the unequal treatment of Jews: 
1. “How does the church judge this action, and what is the church called upon to do about 
it?” 
2. “What are the consequences for the church’s position toward baptized Jews in its 
congregations?”9 
At the time of the conflict, Lutheran views of church and state relations dominated theological 
discussions concerning political affairs.  The so-called “Two Kingdoms” doctrine of heavenly 
and worldly realms was commonplace among the Protestant clergy, not to mention the culture at 
large.  On this view, church and state both exist within a worldly kingdom separated from the 
kingdom of heaven.  The church is not separate from the world, but is part of it.  While God has 
chosen to reign over the spiritual heavenly kingdom of believers through Christ -- the expression 
                                                     
9 DBWE 12:362 
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of God’s grace -- the worldly kingdom of material and flesh is ruled exclusively by government 
through the creation and enforcement of laws.  These laws are necessary in order to restrain the 
evil committed by those who are not members of the heavenly kingdom; or those who have not 
devoted themselves to the grace offered by Christ.  As one commentator writes “[t]his state-
supporting theology of Bonhoeffer’s professors and most other church leaders, which lent itself 
to passive acceptance of state directives on the part of church and citizens (in theory and in fact), 
was consistent with the German ecclesial structure and history in pre-Weimar and Weimar 
years.”10  The Lutheran interpretation of Romans 13:1-711, therefore, concludes that the state’s 
authority reigns over the church as the primary establishment of God’s will on Earth.  
Bonhoeffer characterizes the Lutheran view this way: 
There is no doubt that the church of the Reformation is not encouraged to get involved 
directly in specific political actions of the state.  The church has neither to praise nor to 
censure the laws of the state.  Instead, is has to affirm the state as God’s order of 
preservation in this godless world.12 
Though Bonhoeffer will soon challenge the doctrines of his inherited denomination later in the 
essay, he recognizes the role of the state as a righteous wielder of force, though the use of this 
force has complicated moral consequences.  He writes that while the church “knows about the 
                                                     
10 Gides, 66 
11 “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except from 
God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists 
authority resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are 
not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Do you wish to have no fear of the authority? Then do 
what is good, and you will receive its approval; for it is God’s servant for your good. But if you 
do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain! It is the 
servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer. Therefore one must be subject, not only 
because of wrath but also because of conscience. For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the 
authorities are God’s servants, busy with this very thing. Pay to all what is due them—taxes to 
whom taxes are due, revenue to whom revenue is due, respect to whom respect is due, honor to 
whom honor is due.” Rom 13:1-7, NRSV.  
12 DBWE 12: 362-363 
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essential necessity for the use of force in this world, [it also] knows about the ‘moral’ injustice 
that is necessarily involved in the use of force in certain concrete actions.”13  This comment is 
striking for two reasons: first, Bonhoeffer admits an awareness from the perspective of a 
churchman that the state will often veer into unjust applications of its authorized role.  Second, 
and directly relevant to the heart of my thesis, this comment suggests an early rendition of 
Bonhoeffer’s acceptance that sin is an inherent risk of direct political action.  He is not yet ready 
to flesh out the implications of this fact on the lives of individual Christians, having yet to be 
pressured by the circumstances of the decade to come.  Still, this admission demonstrates that his 
early view of government includes the possibility of unjust uses of force within the context of a 
larger enterprise.    
 However, Bonhoeffer does make clear in “The Church and the Jewish Question” that the 
church itself ought not to take direct political action against the state, a claim he will affirm for 
the remainder of his life.  It is not the church’s role to presume to function as the state by 
creating or enforcing laws.  Nor can the church act as a political force against specific 
declarations of the state.  “Instead,” Bonhoeffer writes, the church “can and must, precisely 
because it does not moralize about individual cases, keep asking the government whether its 
actions can be considered legitimate state actions, that is, actions that create law and order, not 
lack of rights and disorder.”14  This statement is a rare but somewhat vague declaration about the 
specific functions of the state.  As Bonhoeffer will go on to explain, the legitimacy of state action 
is whether the state is creating “law and order, not lack of rights and disorder.”15  The character 
of the state is to create law and order by exercising force.  The role of the church is not to 
                                                     
13 Ibid 363 
14 Ibid 364 
15 Ibid 
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challenge for control of these operations, but the church must always clearly question the state as 
to whether it is truly fulfilling its legitimacy and character.  This is not taking responsibility away 
from the state, but actually placing the burden of law and order entirely in the hands of the state. 
 It is also appropriate to note that Bonhoeffer’s use of the term “state” will evolve over 
time and become something different in his later thought.  In “The Church and the Jewish 
Question,” he had not yet developed his work on the four mandates I have identified in previous 
chapters.  As a result, the notion of ‘government’ as an authorized mandate of natural life had not 
been established.  In this 1933 essay, the use of “state” tends to lump together Bonhoeffer’s later 
understanding of government as a mandate with the actions of a particular regime.  In the final 
chapter entitled Church and State: II, I will argue that Bonhoeffer’s work in Ethics, Letters and 
Papers from Prison, and other later works, distinguishes between government and state.  At the 
time of “The Church and the Jewish Question,” Bonhoeffer’s political theology did not yet 
recognize this distinction.    
Bonhoeffer had, however, made a distinction between the actions of the church and 
individual Christians.  He writes that the church “cannot prevent individual Christians, who 
know that are called to do so in certain cases, from accusing the state of ‘inhumanity;’ but as 
church it will only ask whether the state is creating law and order.”16  The actions of individual 
Christians cannot, therefore, be confused with the ordained functions of the church at large.  The 
scope of Christ’s relevance to human lives cannot be reduced to only the domain of the church.  
On the other hand, neither can the church take on the moral freedom of individuals to act against 
the government whenever there are accusations of state malpractice.  However, it is not until 
later in Ethics, LPFP, and “Theological Position Paper on Church and State” that his moral 
                                                     
16 Ibid 364 
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distinction between church and individual Christians is explained in a meaningful way.  This too 
will be a subject of the final chapter. 
Question One: Three Possibilities of Church Responses to the State 
It is under these general parameters we find the somewhat famous (or infamous) “three 
possibilities for action that the church can take vis-à-vis the state” which Bonhoeffer describes as 
responses to Nazi persecution.17  The first two possibilities mentioned are the following: 
 “[F]irst […] questioning the state as the legitimate state character of its actions, that is, 
making the state responsible for what it does.” 
 “Second is service to the victims of the state’s actions.  The church has an unconditional 
obligation toward the victims of any societal order, even if they do not belong to the 
Christian community.”18 19 
While the first action is summarized by Bonhoeffer’s comments on the church’s ability to 
question the legitimacy and character of the state, the second action prompts us to reflect on the 
consequences of this possibility of action for the persecuted Jews in Germany.  The second 
action is the charitable work of Christians for the world, but does not directly challenge the 
authority of the state in acting unjustly.  At this stage, the church is not seeking to prevent 
injustice from the state.  Instead, according to Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of Galatians 6:10, 
Christians are obligated to care for those who receive such injustices from the state.  And, as 
Bonhoeffer notes, this obligation extends beyond help toward only fellow Christians.  Rather, the 
good of all in response to persecution is given to Christians and non-Christians alike.   
                                                     
17 Ibid 365 
18 Ibid 
19 Here Bonhoeffer adds a quotation from Gal. 6:10: “So then, whenever we have an opportunity, 
let us work for the good of all, and especially for those of the family of faith.” NRSV 
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Interpreters of Bonhoeffer have argued that his return to Germany from a second trip to the 
United States in 1939 is an example of these first two actions.  According to Gides, Bonhoeffer’s 
return was an explicit break from the two-sphered thinking of traditional Lutheranism.  The 
division of spirit and world is shattered by Bonhoeffer’s direct participation in political matters 
on explicitly Christian grounds.  This choice also defies the sequestration of the Confessing 
Church’s “Barman Declaration,” instead engaging directly with the damage within Germany.  
Bonhoeffer’s return to his home country is a moment of interaction between church and state as 
described by the first possibility of action and a real world example of Bonhoeffer’s rejection of 
the Lutheran Two Kingdoms doctrine.  His desire to participate in the healing of Germany after 
the war is described by the second possibility.  By noting his mistake in returning to America in 
his letter to Reinhold Niebuhr, 20  Bonhoeffer confirms that the church at large may question the 
state and assist the victims of state action.  A tacit resignation to the authority of the state and the 
aftermath of its actions cannot exist.  
Next, there are two widely read English translations of Bonhoeffer’s third possibility for 
action by the church which can be found below: 
 DBWE vol. 12, p.365-366: 
“The third possibility is not just to bind up the wounds of the victims beneath the wheel 
but to seize the wheel itself.” 
                                                     
20 Bonhoeffer’s letter to Niebuhr read as follows: 
“I have made a mistake in coming to America.  I must live through this difficult period of 
our national history with the Christian people of Germany.  I will have no right to 
participate in the reconstruction of Christian life in Germany after the war if I do not 
share in the trials of this time with my people …. Christians in Germany will face a 
terrible alternative of either willing the defeat of their nation in order that Christian 
civilization may survive, or willing the victory of their nation and thereby destroying our 
civilization.  I know which of these alternatives I must choose; but I cannot make that 
choice in security.”  Bethge, 655 
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 No Rusty Swords: Letters, Lectures and Notes 1928-1936, p. 225: 
“The third possibility is not just to bandage the victims under the where, but to put a 
spoke in the wheel itself.”  
For my purposes, the differences in these two translations are nuanced and I do not have the 
requisite knowledge of the German language to resolve any conflicts.  I will instead assume that 
Bonhoeffers phrase “direct political action” is a plausible interpretation which satisfies the intent 
of both translations.21  By this, I take him to mean the church taking on a posture of disobedience 
toward the government’s authority to create and sustain law and order.  Direct political action by 
the church is permissible “if the church sees the state to be failing in its function of creating law 
and order” by creating injustice and disorder.  In the historical circumstances of the time, 
Bonhoeffer began to see state intrusions into the functions of the church through the actions of 
the German Christians and the introduction of the Aryan Paragraph as examples of the state 
failing to uphold its proper role.   
According to Bonhoeffer, the “obligatory exclusion of baptized Jews from our Christian 
congregations or a ban on missions to the Jews” as stipulated by the Aryan Paragraph, is an 
example of a state attack on the nature of the church.22  The German Christians’ efforts to 
persecute Jews from within the churches themselves abused the mission of the church.  Such an 
act by the state is one of self-negation; an instance of enforcing too much order upon the 
mandate tasked with teaching the truth of Christ to the world.  Rather, “[t]he church cannot allow 
the state to proscribe for it the way it treats its members,” particularly baptized Jews within the 
churches.23  
                                                     
21 DBWE 12: 363 
22 Ibid 366 
23 Ibid 368 
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Question Two: “Gentile” and “Jewish” Christianity 
Because of this view, Bonhoeffer answers his second question concerning the treatment 
of Jews, baptized or otherwise, in controversial ways.24  To begin, Bonhoeffer writes the 
following: 
From the point of view of Christ’s church, Judaism is never a racial concept but rather a 
religious one.  Rather than the biologically dubious entity of the Jewish race, it means the 
‘people Israel.’  It is God’s law that constitutes the ‘people’ Israel; thus, one can become 
a Jew by accepting the law.25    
A Christian church of the “Jewish” variety is one where the exclusion of members based on 
observances of divine law is valid.  Biblically, Bonhoeffer is referring to controversies in the 
early Christian churches concerning the relations between Jews and Gentiles.  Bonhoeffer writes, 
“Jewish Christians in the church’s sense are those who see their belonging to the people of God, 
to the church of Christ, as determined by their observance of divine law.”26  The apostle Paul, 
according to one account,27 confronts the apostle Peter about excluding Gentile Christians from 
sharing a meal with the Jewish Christians because the gentiles were uncircumcised, violating a 
sacred tradition of Jewish ritual practice.  Bonhoeffer’s view of church does not accept 
exclusionary practices within the church beyond baptism.28  Instead, “Gentile Christians […] see 
no other prerequisite for their belonging to the people of God, to the church of Christ, than being 
called to it by God, through God’s Word in Christ.”29  To reject membership from the churches 
because of a person’s ethnic heritage is to violate the basic mission of the church.  He writes that 
                                                     
24 Recall footnote eight of this section concerning Bonhoeffer’s critics.  
25 DBWE 12: 368 
26 Ibid 
27 Galatians 2:11-13 
28 Hence Bonhoeffer’s continual use of the term “baptized Jews” to describe individuals of 
Jewish ethnic heritage who had become members of the Christian church, as opposed to non-
baptized Jews toward which the church has obligations to preach to and assist against the state.  
29 DBWE 12: 368 
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“to exclude persons who are racially Jewish from our ethnically German church would mean to 
make it into a church of the Jewish type.”30   
 It is unfortunate that Bonhoeffer maintains the term “Jewish Christianity” in light of the 
atrocities around him.  To the contemporary reader, the insensitivity of this description is 
disconcerting.  However, it is not impossible to appreciate Bonhoeffer’s efforts from a charitable 
perspective.  Central to the depth of Bonhoeffer’s Christology is the reconciliation between God 
and human beings on the cross.  A further implication of this reconciliation is the creation of a 
church, centered around the reality of Christ, which no longer recognizes the in-group, out-group 
distinctions demanded by traditional law.31  Under this view, the so-called “Gentile Christian” 
approach according to Bonhoeffer, for the church to invoke any ritual or legalistic discrimination 
toward baptized members of the church, thereby preventing them from participating in the 
church-community, is to invoke an antiquated custom characteristic of early Jewish Christians as 
Peter did in his episode with Paul in Galatians.  Bonhoeffer’s use of the “Jewish Christian” 
designation is misleading to those seeking to make sense of Bonhoeffer’s responses to the state 
in “Church and the Jewish Question.”  In the German Christians’ efforts to exclude Jews from 
the churches, they have taken on a trait characteristic of the “Jewish” identity they claim to 
despise.  It is the hypocrisy of Bonhoeffer’s opponents that, in the context of the Church 
Struggle, his criticism intends to expose.       
 It is instructive for us that Bonhoeffer chooses to focus on the Psalms, a centerpiece of 
the Hebrew Bible, in his teaching on Christian prayer.  Prayerbook of the Bible [DBWE 5:155-
160] confirms, in Greene’s view, that Bonhoeffer’s Christological emphasis included the use of 
                                                     
30 DBWE 12: 369 
31 Three passages from the Pauline epistles are relevant here: Galatians 3:28, Colossians 3:11,and 
Ephesians 2:11-22. 
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Old Testament scriptures in a time when German theological teaching had allowed anti-Jewish 
sentiments to obscure the role of the Old Testament in Christian life.  Bonhoeffer controversially 
reminds his German students that the reality of Christ is affirmed by a tradition of prayer which 
includes the ancient King David of Israel.  He writes that “we who pray are, first of all, the whole 
community of faith in which alone the entire richness of the Psalter can be prayed.”32  In order to 
learn how to pray, Christians must follow the practice of Jesus himself, who in teaching his 
disciples to pray, made use of his Hebrew ancestry.  The Germans Christians cannot, therefore, 
purge the Christian church of Jewish influence without purging the tradition of Christ himself.   
Conclusions 
 While “The Church and the Jewish Question” provides us with a beginning of 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of resistance against state actions, the ambiguity of the “three 
possibilities of action” is problematic.  Bonhoeffer is simply too vague.  For example, it is not 
easy to tease out what Bonhoeffer means by claiming that the state must “create law and order, 
not lack of rights and disorder.”33  The issue of ‘rights’ is raised here in reference to the proper 
role of the state but never addressed again.  A sophisticated basis from which laws and rights are 
to be considered is not explored here, though we can infer that such topics would necessarily 
include the message of Christ since “it is from the Christian proclamation and faith that the state 
receives its own rights.” 34 
 What is more, Bonhoeffer contradicts himself about when the church may or may not 
oppose the state.  Toward the beginning of his essay, he writes that “[e]ven on the Jewish 
question today, the church cannot contradict the state directly and demand that it take any 
                                                     
32 DBWE 5:160 
33 DBWE 12: 364 
34 Ibid 365 
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particular different course of action.”35  Later, of course, such a “seizing of the wheel” is 
permitted when the state encroaches on the church’s ability to spread the Gospel and include 
baptized Jews in that mission.  Still, Bonhoeffer’s efforts to stand against the German Christians 
are admirable regardless of how persuasive “The Church and the Jewish Question” is in terms of 
political theory.  In light of the somewhat fickle response of the Confessing Church’s “Barmen 
Declaration” and its silence on the suffering of the Jews, Bonhoeffer defends the Jewish 
population like few others in his community.  
 What we can learn from Bonhoeffer’s early thought in this essay is two-fold: first, that 
the division between church and government is affirmed by Bonhoeffer’s description of their 
respective role, and that those role conflict with the broader Lutheran tradition.  Second, this 
division of church and government conflicts with the “Two Kingdoms” doctrine since the church 
has obligations to question the state, heal the state’s victims even when asked to do otherwise, 
and to directly oppose the state when its rightful mission is usurped.  Of course, the specific roles 
of church and government are impossible to know from “The Church and the Jewish Question.”  
But we see an early rendition of the themes which will become more broadly addressed toward 
the end of Bonhoeffer’s life. 
                                                     
35 Ibid 364 
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CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT: II 
“Where will the call to discipleship lead those who follow it?  What decisions and painful 
separations will it entail?  We must take this question to him who alone knows the answer.  Only 
Jesus Christ, who bids us follow him, knows where the path will lead.  But we know that it will be 
a path full of mercy beyond measure.”1 
 
 In this second chapter on Bonhoeffer’s views of the church-government relation, I will 
draw from Ethics, “Theological Position Paper on Church and State,” (TPPCS) and Letters and 
Papers from Prison to present his understanding of political life during his final years (1940-
1945).  Then, to conclude, I will examine the question of Christian sin with respect to 
Bonhoeffer’s complicity in attempted tyrannicide.  How did Bonhoeffer view his actions from an 
ethical standpoint, and how does his Christology shape his self-understanding given the ethical 
problem confronting him?  The repercussions of ‘seizing the wheel’ may come at great cost to 
both the government (see TPPCS) as well as the individual (see LPFP), but this is the risk 
Bonhoeffer takes in a bold venture of faith: he has no guarantee that he will not become guilty in 
this effort, but such a risk points him back to the centrality of Jesus Christ.  Christ came as a 
merciful savior, and it is that mercy that Christians and Bonhoeffer must rely upon when taking 
action to oppose the mandated authority of government.  
I. Government and Church: The Prison Years 
Bonhoeffer’s Later Political Theology 
Much of Bonhoeffer’s thinking had evolved between 1933 and his writings in Ethics, 
Letters and Papers from Prison, and “Theological Position Paper on Church and State,” possibly 
as a result of the stresses of war or merely the passage of time, but I want to return to two key 
distinctions which Bonhoeffer vaguely alludes to in “The Church and the Jewish Question,” but 
                                                     
1 DBWE 4:40 
 
 
49 
now explores in greater detail in TPPCS, as well as Ethics.  First, the difference between 
government and state; second, the responsibility of individual Christians versus the role of the 
church generally.  To begin this chapter, I will use TPPCS and Ethics to establish the basic 
political theory behind Bonhoeffer’s decision to aid the conspiracy.  Through the two major 
distinctions mentioned above, I will argue that Bonhoeffer maintains the Christological authority 
of government, while providing for the possibility of resistance against particular states by 
individual Christians.  The more personal circumstances of Bonhoeffer’s decision, as well as the 
consequences of that choice on his thought as a whole, will be addressed in the second part of 
this chapter. 
In the TPPCS, penned by Bonhoeffer sometime during his later years (1940-1945), we 
see an affirmation of many of themes from “The Church and the Jewish Question” written nearly 
a decade earlier, except that his exploration of the specific roles of government and church in 
relation to one another is described in greater depth.  Furthermore, this work is Bonhoeffer’s 
most concise articulation of the boundaries between church and government when compared to 
the piece-meal approach we find in Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison.  He is speaking 
with largely general language here, choosing not to relate his specific claims to the historical 
details of Germany at the time, though we again see his commitment to the importance of time 
and place considerations for making ethical choices.    
Government Grounded from ‘Above’ 
The measure of a good government is the extent to which it creates and preserves law and 
justice where the other mandates (church, family, and work) are free to affirm Christ.  
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Bonhoeffer interprets Romans 132 as the scripture’s way of instituting a mandate that affirms the 
will of God by its very existence.  He clarifies that “[t]he concept of the state is alien to the New 
Testament,” but “[g]overnment is the vicarious representative action of God on earth.”3  
Bonhoeffer’s vision of a Christian basis for government lies in his interpretation of scriptural 
references to the authority of governing powers, but does not equate such authority with an 
approval of every form of statecraft or every action of government.  Furthermore, he believes 
that the intellectual tradition of the West has obscured the biblical grounding of government and 
replaced it with immanent sources of authority; or, what he calls government from ‘below.’  
What Bonhoeffer actually means by government from ‘below’ is the grounding of government in 
either human nature, sin, or in the life and culture of a people (Volk).  Generally speaking, 
Bonhoeffer makes clear that government cannot be authorized by worldly elements in the 
following passage: 
Wherever the state is derived from created human nature, the concept of government is 
dissolved and reconstructed from below […].  Where the state becomes the fulfillment of 
all spheres of human life and culture, it forfeits its true dignity, its specific authority as 
government.4 
Government which is grounded in the fulfillment or right ordering of human nature is attributed 
to the Classical thinkers, especially Aristotle and much of the Catholic intellectual tradition.  
Meanwhile, the government grounded in life and culture is attributed to Hegelian influences and 
19th century Romanticism.  In response to both, Bonhoeffer writes that “[i]n distinction from the 
forms of commonwealth permitted by God, government is established and ordained by God 
                                                     
2 “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is not authority except from 
God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists 
authority resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment.” Rom 13:1-2 
NRSV 
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alone.  People, culture, social nature, etc. are world.”5  These views typify Bonhoeffer’s 
understanding of government from ‘below,’ where any statecraft is constructed on the basis of 
some kind of human fulfillment.  He writes that in Aristotle, for example, the polis is “the 
highest perfection of the rational nature of the human being.”6  Also, in his view, Augustine’s 
contribution to Western formulations of government was to ground its basis in the Christian 
doctrine of the fall—a view which later took hold in the Reformation.  Bonhoeffer also rejects 
natural law as the legitimate basis of government because it has been historically ambiguous and 
justified under suspicious authorities.  He argues that natural law “can establish the tyrannical 
state as well as the state governed by laws, the people’s state as well as imperialism, democracy 
as well as dictatorship.”7  Ultimately, Bonhoeffer is concerned that “the establishment of the 
state in sin as well as in human nature leads to a concept of the state in itself and thus apart from 
its relation to Jesus Christ.”8 
Bonhoeffer rejects these ‘worldly’ groundings of government because, for him, to speak 
about government at all is only sensible with the understanding that all things are made through 
Christ.  This mediating term, “through,” is essential since it places the validity of political life 
and government within the authority of what God has accomplished for human beings, not in 
what humans are capable of accomplishing for themselves.  Any state, or particular iteration of 
government, can be measured against its obligation to affirm the other mandates regardless of its 
rhetoric or superficial efforts to appear religious.   
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The ‘being’ of government as a mandate has been instituted by the authority of God, but 
the actions of a particular government can always be questioned by the church.  Bonhoeffer 
refers to four examples in the Bible where the language of ‘for’ and ‘through’ Christ appears 
most clearly: 
 Colossians 1:16-17 “[F]or in [Christ] all things in heaven and on earth were created, 
things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or powers” 
 John 1:3 “All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came 
into being.” 
 1 Corinthians 8:6 “yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and 
for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through 
whom we exist.” 
 Hebrews 1:2 “but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed heir 
of all things, through whom he also created the worlds.” 
For these reasons, Bonhoeffer believes it is impossible to view any category of the natural9 
human experience as being apart from Christ if we are to accept the New Testament claims.  
 As has been mentioned before, the specific authorization of government as a mandate 
and the expectation for service and obedience under its rule is derived from Romans 13, and now 
Bonhoeffer adds 1 Peter 2.  At the time of authoring his TPPCS, Bonhoeffer is comfortable with 
government having the power of the “sword,” to borrow Augustine’s term, in order to 
accomplish the “negative task of punishing the wicked but also the positive task of commending 
                                                     
9 Again, the term “natural” is understood in Bonhoeffer’s terms: “that which, after the fall, is 
directed toward the coming of Jesus Christ.” Ethics, 173 
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the good as well as the godly.”10 11  Bonhoeffer clarifies that the action of government “refers not 
to an action that is Christian but an action that does not exclude Jesus Christ.”12  Whether or not 
governments are aware of their divinely authorized task of establishing and preserving order to 
create space for the other mandates, especially the church, to teach the world about Christ, is not 
relevant.  A seemingly secular state can perform this function without necessarily setting out to 
do so.  Indeed, even if the state explicitly desires to repress its task of preserving order and 
justice for the sake of Christ, Bonhoeffer believes that this rejection only proclaims the truth of 
God by creating a “witness to the name of Christ through the suffering of the church-
community.”13  The government, in a way, inevitably serves the cause of Christ and his victory 
over death regardless of its intentions.  It either embraces its role as a preserving power, or it a 
makes martyrs out of those who become its victims.   
But Bonhoeffer’s distinction between grounding government from ‘above’ rather than 
‘below’ has frequently been misinterpreted by scholars who confuse Bonhoeffer’s use of 
government as a mandate with judgments of particular regime types.  For example, Green and 
DeJonge note that Bonhoeffer’s “vision of government from above also challenges if not a 
democratic form of government, certainly a democratic justification for it”14  The initial 
implication of this statement is misleading, if not reckless.  Bonhoeffer is clear in his own words 
                                                     
10 DBWE 16: 514-515 
11 Here Bonhoeffer cites 1 Peter 2:14; I will add verses 13-17 for the sake of improved context: 
“For the Lord’s sake accept the authority of every human institution, whether of the emperor as 
supreme, or of governors, as sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to praise those who 
do right.  For it is God’s will that by doing right you should silence the ignorance of the foolish.  
As servants of God, live as free people, yet do not use your freedom as a pretext for evil.  Honor 
everyone.  Love the family of believers.  Fear God.  Honor the emperor.” NRSV 
12 DBWE 16:515 
13 Ibid 516 
14 DBR, Green and DeJonge, 699 
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that “the concept of government includes no definitive form of commonwealth, no definitive 
form of the state.”15  While he does view government as a mandate issued from ‘above,’ we 
should not take this as a defense or criticism of any particular form of statecraft as it is practiced 
in the real world.  We see here that Bonhoeffer is not overtly an opponent of democracy per se, 
but opposes any basis of the state which opposes the role of God as creator by taking the 
functions of the other mandates upon itself.  What would be objectionable to Bonhoeffer is 
grounding the authorization of a democracy’s existence in something worldly like ‘the will of the 
people’ or immanent laws.  The role of laws or a democratic vox populi must function in tandem 
with the Christological center of gospel and law.   
Government as the Restrainer 
In Ethics, Bonhoeffer invokes scripture again to characterize the role of government 
within the Protestant doctrinal milieu of a fallen world.  Due to the entrance of death into 
creation by the advent of sin, or godlessness, Bonhoeffer believes the mandate of government 
serve the spiritual purpose of creating and preserving order on earth in the face of evil and 
communal disintegration.  While the function of government is spiritually relevant, Bonhoeffer 
distinguishes it from the role of the church.  Neither government nor the church has the task or 
ability to take on the other’s role.  In the case of government, Bonhoeffer refers to the mandated 
role as that of a “restrainer” against the disorder and disintegration of the world.  Although this 
power is biblically sanctioned, Bonhoeffer does not believe government can remain guiltless in 
its application of the restraining power.   
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In defining the function of government and its ability to enforce laws, Bonhoeffer refers 
to 2 Thessalonians 2:716 for a biblical basis of government’s authority to, as has been established 
from Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of 1 Peter 2:13-17: to punish the wicked and reward the good.  
The government is tasked with creating and preserving law and order for the sake of keeping 
open the possibility of following Christ.  We see Bonhoeffer double down on this stance during 
the “Restrainer” passage in Ethics.  Bonhoeffer’s view of government recognizes the necessary 
use of force in order to preserve law and stability in the world.  In order to preserve the 
possibility of human beings having an openness to Christ, Bonhoeffer argues that government 
must wield enough force to punish those who could threaten that possibility by spreading 
disorder and sin.  The “restraining power” authorizes government with “the ordering power, 
equipped with great physical strength, which stands in the way of those who would throw 
themselves into the abyss.”17  Government as a mandated authority on earth exists with the 
power to clear a space for the other mandates to take hold among human beings.  Thus, 
government only performs its Christo-centric function when it affirms the necessity of the other 
mandates by protecting them from the influence of sinful powers in the world.   
This practical power to enforce laws is separate from the mandate of the church.  As has 
been discussed previously, Bonhoeffer vehemently opposes government incursions into the 
functions of the church, but neither can the church take on the role of the state by openly 
challenging and replacing the state’s role as the restrainer.  There is a difference between the 
church and government, and the church ought not reach beyond its actual competence and 
presume to know where and how force must be applied.  Bonhoeffer writes that “[t]he church is 
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today the community of people who, grasped by the power of Christ’s grace, acknowledge, 
confess, and take upon themselves not only their personal sins, but also the Western world’s 
falling away from Jesus Christ as guilt toward Jesus Christ.”18  The communal whole of the 
Christian church must share in the suffering of Germany’s victims through confession of its own 
complicity in the crisis.  The church shares the blame for Nazism’s rise along with the other 
mandates, all of which play a part in the spiritual formation of the German people.  The four 
mandates became misaligned by the government’s over-assertion of authority.  Bonhoeffer’s 
frustration with the church’s failure to adequately respond informs his understanding of the 
boundaries between mandates.  Because of this shared responsibility, Bonhoeffer’s later thinking 
still expresses the rightful roles of church and government in relation to one another: “The sword 
can never bring about the unity of the church and of faith; preaching can never rule the peoples.  
But the lord of both kingdoms is God revealed in Jesus Christ.”19  Each mandate holds a proper 
role, yet each has failed to uphold the centrality of Christ.  The solution cannot come from a 
competition of power between church and government, but from both mandates recognizing the 
necessity of Jesus to their formation and performance.    
It is important to reaffirm Bonhoeffer’s opposition to any ethical impunity for state 
actions.  The mandated authority of government does not grant particular states a free pass on 
injustice.  Bonhoeffer qualifies that concerning the role of the “Restrainer”—the power of the 
state—in 2 Thessalonians 2:7, “[t]he ‘restraining power [das Aufhaltende] itself is not God and is 
not without guilt but God uses it to protect the world from disintegration.”20  The restrainer is not 
and cannot be guiltless.  Government can become guilty of injustice by improperly applying its 
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power and punishing the innocent, or by setting itself up as the source of spiritual and ethical 
authority above God.   
The restraining power Bonhoeffer believes is biblically granted to government is the 
power of the sword, given so that it may carry out its mandated task of preserving space for the 
other mandates to teach and preserve the revelation of Christ to the world.  This force is given to 
prevent the disintegration and decay of the other mandates brought on by communal 
disintegration and godlessness.  However, Bonhoeffer does not address the problem of human 
agency as the restraining power.  More specifically, he provides no guidance for Christians who 
are themselves officials of the state.  The restraining power of government may be authorized by 
the New Testament, but the violence necessary to “punish the wicked” can only be exercised by 
human beings with the same ethical culpability Bonhoeffer faces in his own experience with 
violence.  This particular element of human life, especially for Christians, is not explored.  A 
soldier or statesman might commit acts of violence in service to government, but the 
Christological center of such actions is difficult to see.  Service toward government is consistent 
with Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the mandate, yet Christian participation in government poses 
a similar ethical problem to the one Bonhoeffer himself faces through the possibility of violence.    
The Relationship between Gospel and Law  
Moving away from the first distinction between government and state, which Bonhoeffer 
clarifies through his conception of government from ‘above,’ we begin to see the role of the 
church and individual Christians in contrast to the mandate of government.  First, the integration 
of law and gospel for the church “refutes the view that the church could speak to the world on 
the basis of some kind of shared insights, derived from a rational or natural law, that is, by a 
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temporary disregarding of the gospel.”21  The church cannot separate itself from the functions of 
government without either undermining the rightful authority of the government by setting itself 
up in opposition to the government’s authority, or by creating a double morality.  Bonhoeffer 
clarifies that synthesizing law and church under the centrality of Christ “leads to the rejection of 
a double morality of the church, namely, one for the world and another for the church-
community, one for the pagans, and another for Christians, one for Christians in their worldly 
vocations and another for the homo religious.”22 23  Although the church, like government, 
cannot take the role of other mandates upon itself, Bonhoeffer’s view does not permit the church 
to isolate itself from the ethical problems of real life (sometimes exposed in the midst of political 
matters) by creating a separate code of laws or standards that apply to the church but not anyone 
else.  
Not even the Decalogue can be thought of as law apart from Jesus Christ.  Even while the 
commandments identify, in Bonhoeffer’s assessment, rights to life, property, marriage, and 
human honor, “this does not mean that these orders, codified in to law [Rechtsordnungen], would 
have an absolute divine value as such, but merely that God alone seeks to be honored and 
worshipped” through their implementation in daily life.24  Like other universal principles or 
natural laws, the operational purpose of the Ten Commandments exists only for the sake of God 
himself.  They are “not a second divine source of authority alongside and in addition to the God 
of Jesus Christ.”25  Therefore, the message the church preaches to the world can never rightfully 
be a disintegration between the authority of laws as established by the state, and the authority of 
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some abstract rubric of religious behavior.  Ultimately, since both church and government serve 
the cause of Christ, the message of the church must be the unification of law and gospel through 
the power of Jesus.   
Because of this unavoidable service to the will of God, Bonhoeffer stresses that 
obedience and service to governing powers is demanded by God’s revelation in scripture as 
observed in Rom. 13 and 1 Pet. 2, not to mention Jesus’ own words in Matt. 22:19-21.26  This 
obligation can only be defied “where the government forces [Christians] into direct violation of 
the divine commandment.”27  However, the decision to resist, or in Bonhoeffer’s words, “the 
refusal to obey within a specific historical political decision of government […] can only be a 
venture of one’s own responsibility.”28  Here we see a clear example of Bonhoeffer’s distinction 
between individual Christians and the church at large.  Bonhoeffer is skeptical of imposing 
church authority on matters of law and state policy.  He writes in “Protestantism without 
Reformation” that, in America, “[t]he Prohibition legislation caused an unprecedented upsurge in 
crime in the large cities.  A ‘Christian’ law had brought disaster for the state and had to be 
rescinded—with the consent of the churches.” 29  The church, as a mandated body of believers, 
does not have the competence or jurisdiction to exercise its wisdom in the form of law in an 
attempt to supplant the appropriate role of government.  In this case Bonhoeffer cites an instance 
of violence in order to empower his rationale, but pointing out explicit consequences of the 
church’s usurpation of government’s given authority is not necessary to Bonhoeffer’s view of the 
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‘Give therefore to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s, and to God the things that are 
God’s.’” NRSV 
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mandates.  The conclusion is that whenever the church attempts to circumvent, hijack, or replace 
the government as the lawmaking force on earth, it has defeated itself in the same way that 
government does when it infringes on the mission of the church.  
Germany against Christ 
It remains to be seen how Bonhoeffer relates the specific actions of Nazi Germany to his 
understanding of the church-government relation described in his aforementioned political 
theology.  Bonhoeffer articulates his position in three different ways: first, the German churches 
had failed in upholding the cause of Christ; second, driving the Jews from Germany and Europe 
was akin to driving out Christ himself; and third, the crisis in the West has removed Christ from 
the center and redefined the value of human life by standards from ‘below.’  
Bonhoeffer notes that Germany’s vulnerability to the allure of Nazism was rooted in its 
historical and intellectual attachment to community.  From Luther to the German idealist 
philosophers, Bonhoeffer believes Germans have uniquely emphasized “deliverance from self-
will through service to community.”30  The ironic and tragic failure of many Germans was that 
through their service to community, they had assisted in the genocidal will of Hitler and his 
associates.  When the German commitment to community manifested in service to a violent 
regime, Bonhoeffer believes the Christian churches were forced into tension with the 
government above them.  On this point, Bonhoeffer compares the challenge of the German 
churches to the early struggles of ancient Christianity:  
Once again we have the living experience on our side: we are talking about a time when, 
under the pressure of anti-Christian powers, small confessing congregations gathered and 
had to seek a clear decision for or against Christ through strict discipline of doctrine and 
life.  In their struggle these confessing congregations were forced to recognize that the 
very neutrality of many Christians was the gravest danger that would lead to the 
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disintegration and dissolution of the church, indeed, that it was essentially hostility 
toward Christ.31  
Bonhoeffer viewed Nazi incursions into the German churches, including the introduction of the 
Aryan Paragraph, as a direct affront to the integrity of the church.  Furthermore, Nazi abuses 
against the Jewish population in Europe directly conflicted with New Testament teachings 
concerning the treatment of others.  Christians in Germany who either participated in or 
remained neural to these atrocities had, as far as Bonhoeffer was concerned, aligned themselves 
with Hitler’s regime against the true church.  But the centrality of Christ to the creation and 
being of both church and government prevents faithful Christians from placing the authority of 
the state above their discipleship under Christ.  On this point, Bonhoeffer quotes from Matthew 
12:30.32  Given that the mandates are created through and for Christ, no Christian involvement 
with government can be justified when said government acts directly against the cause of Christ.  
Even the churches and “Christians” of Bonhoeffer’s era are not safe from the foundational 
importance of living for Christ.  Put simply: German Christians who chose to participate in the 
Nazi program, as well as those who remained passive or neutral to the regime’s actions, were 
unquestionably against Christ.  
 The failure of the churches to uphold their biblical commitment to what Bonhoeffer 
understood to be the centrality of Christ allowed the persecution of the Jews to continue in 
Germany.  Bonhoeffer believes this persecution was directly related to the absence of genuine 
Christian civil courage and represented a denial of Jesus’ role in the cultural formation of the 
German people.  
 The historical Jesus Christ is the continuity of [the West’s] history.  Because Jesus Christ 
was the promised Messiah of the Israelite-Jewish people, the line of our forebears reaches 
back before the appearance of Jesus Christ into the people of Israel.  Western history is 
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by God’s will inextricably bound up with the people of Israel, not just genetically but in 
an honest, unceasing encounter.  The Jews keep open the question of Christ; they are the 
sign of God’s free, gracious election and of God’s rejecting wrath; ‘see the kindness and 
the severity of God’ (Rom. 11:22).  Driving out the Jews from the West must result in 
driving out Christ with them, for Jesus Christ was a Jew.33   
Bonhoeffer stresses that Jesus was not only ethnically Jewish, but also that his Jewish identity 
influences German Christianity from the standpoint of historical heritage.  Because the 
appearance of Jesus as a real human being occurs within history and becomes inextricably 
embedded within the history of the West,34 Christ’s Jewish identity and the Jewish identity of his 
early followers attaches the Jews to the historical heritage of Germany and German Christians.  
Barnes notes that “Bonhoeffer as never before linked Christianity with the Jews as Jews, not as 
potential Christians.”35  Bonhoeffer’s approach to the “Jewish Question” transitions from a 
concern primarily with the problems besetting the Evangelical Churches in 1933 to the impact of 
Nazism within Germany society at large.  The Jewish population, by maintaining their rejection 
of Jesus as the prophesized messiah, represents the open and unresolved work of God in history, 
as well as in the present.  Not only were Christ and his earliest followers Jewish, but by 
condemning the Jews within Germany, the Nazis had closed a worldly representation of God’s 
redemptive work in the world.  For Bonhoeffer and most of his Lutheran contemporaries, the 
Jewish rejection of the New Testament Jesus was a manifestation of God’s openness to the 
necessity of Christian work on earth to spread the Gospel, but also the continuation of the Old 
Testament narrative of rejection and renewal between Yahweh and his followers.  For 
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Bonhoeffer, Nazi persecution of the Jews was a direct attack on both the Christian practice of 
evangelism, as well as a rejection of Christ’s own traditions.   
The historical relevance of this claim demonstrates yet another denunciation of National 
Socialism.  The Aryan Paragraph despite being a state-sanctioned document adopted by the 
Reich churches, can be vehemently opposed by appealing directly to the authority of Christ and 
the talk of government as a mandated space of human experience.  Because the German 
Christians had introduced the Aryan Paragraph into the churches as a means of inserting a 
worldly grounding of Nazism into the mandated space of the church, Bonhoeffer determines that 
the Nazi state has violated its mandate from ‘above’ and inserted itself over the church as an 
authority from ‘below.’  
 This third argument for how Germany had set itself against Christ is related to 
Bonhoeffer’s earlier criticism of any form of ethics which grounds the treatment of others in any 
authority other than God’s.  This includes ethics endorsed by government or any system of 
values appealed to by political authorities.  In persecuting the Jews, Bonhoeffer believed that the 
Nazis had exchanged basic human dignity for “the false presupposition that life consists only in 
its social utility.  This ignores the fact that life created and preserved by God possesses inherent 
right, completely independent of its social utility.”36  Bonhoeffer writes this comment under the 
historical milieu of Nazi mass-murder programs, and this should be understood as a statement of 
political dissent against Nazi Germany’s genocidal practices.37  For Bonhoeffer, these social 
policies were indicative of the disintegration of community via the usurpation of values by 
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37 His comments about “right” of a life preserved by God precludes the possibility that 
Bonhoeffer would view his participation in the Abwehr plot as mere a socially utilitarian good.  
Hitler must be defeated for reasons beyond simply the dangers he brings to society. 
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proclamations of the German state.  He writes that “[t]he most astonishing observation one 
makes today is the people surrender everything in the face of nothingness: their own judgment, 
their humanity, their neighbors.”38   
 In Bonhoeffer’s view, there can be little doubt that Nazi Germany had violated a proper 
understanding of government and its relationship with the church.  The Aryan Paragraph 
exemplifies a deliberate effort to manipulate the prominence of German Evangelical churches to 
aid in the state’s systematic hatred of the Jewish community.  To Bonhoeffer, this misapplication 
of government is a product of Western political, philosophical, and theological developments 
that culminate in the crisis besetting the continent.  He writes “[t]his nothingness into which the 
West is sliding is not the natural end, the dying, the sinking of a flourishing community of 
people.  Instead, it is again a specifically western nothingness: a nothingness that is rebellious, 
violent, anti-God, and anti-human.”39  The West has removed Christ from the center and 
replaced him with an assortment of idols, ranging from conceptions of human reason, Volk, or 
state worship.  While the Western crisis has gripped all of Europe, Germany has become the 
most destructive offender by its assault on the Jews and systematic extermination of its enemies.   
II. Bonhoeffer’s Bold Venture of Faith 
Given that Bonhoeffer has outlined some basic boundaries between church and 
government, and given that he views the actions of Nazi Germany to be unjust, how do we 
interpret his own experience in acting as an individual Christian against the regime?  Does he 
provide a defense for his promotion of violence against Hitler?  The consequences of his 
decisions are, in his mind, unmistakable.  He writes that “[w]here there is even the smallest 
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possibility of allowing the other to stay alive, then the destruction of this life would be arbitrary 
killing – murder.”40  To kill another person cannot be one choice among a set of alternatives.  
There can be literally no other option, otherwise one has committed a cardinal sin of murder.  
Later, however, he reflects from prison that “[i]f I were to end my life here in these conditions, 
[they] would have a meaning that I think I could understand.”41  The fundamental problem of 
Bonhoeffer’s life is now clear: can he be complicit in the killing of Adolph Hitler while still 
maintaining his commitment to the will of God? 
Some commentators on Bonhoeffer claim that his apparent shift in thinking between the 
Christian passivism of Cost of Discipleship and his later works on the subject of direct political 
action constitutes an endorsement of the just use of violence as a means of resistance against a 
government that has established itself as being against Christ.  Gides and Barnes are two such 
examples.  On this shift, Gides explains that, “Bonhoeffer’s changed church-world vision moved 
him from something close to absolute pacifism to a position that can be defined as ‘just war 
thinking including the possibility of tyrannicide.”42  Barnes’ interpretation of quotations selected 
from Ethics also affords the possibility of violence within Bonhoeffer’s amended views on 
political action, as seen when he claims that “[b]reaking the laws of the state through the use of 
violence would be the lesser of two evils [and] might be the only way to preserve the law.”43 
Though it is clear that Bonhoeffer’s views on action against the state certainly evolved between 
“The Church and the Jewish Question” and Ethics, it is important to note that none of the 
quotations selected by Gides or Barnes mention the explicit use of violence.  Gides inserts this 
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term into his reading of Bonhoeffer while providing no textual support for his claim.  Instead, 
Bonhoeffer remains characteristically ambiguous about the precise means of action the church or 
individual Christians may take in resisting the state.   
The purpose of these final pages will be to examine whether Bonhoeffer gives his 
implicit approval of tyrannicide as these and other examiners have suggested.  Contrary to the 
analyses mentioned above, I argue that Bonhoeffer is unwilling or unable to give his actions full 
ethical endorsement.  After all, what is the purpose of Bonhoeffer’s call to God’s mercy if he is 
so convinced that his actions are justifiable in the way that Gides and Barnes have suggested? 
Grabbing hold of the wheel of government may be sensible in worldly terms and consistent with 
the moral conscience of some human beings generally speaking, but that does not satisfy the 
Bonhoeffer’s desire for the grace of God in the final analysis.  We see in Ethics and in Letters 
and Papers from Prison that Bonhoeffer does not give a clear sanctioning of his actions when he 
recollects these events.  To do so would risk allowing the priorities of one’s conscience or ethics 
to trump the authority for ethical authentication granted exclusively to God.  To sanction murder 
may or may not have been the ‘ethical’ thing to do; but regardless, Bonhoeffer believes that 
God’s graciousness toward those who act boldly against injustice is paramount.  A theory of 
Christian ethics which defends tyrannicide on Just War grounds is simply not the world of 
Bonhoeffer.   
Christian Love and Responsible Action 
The core of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of responsible Christian action is his 
interpretation of Jesus Christ’s actions in the world as a human being.  Participating in the world 
with the example of Christ at the forefront is how the distinction between “worldly” and 
“Christian” actions disappears for those following the call of God.  Bonhoeffer writes that “[j]ust 
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as in Jesus Christ God and humanity became one, so through Christ what is Christian and what is 
worldly became one in the action of the Christian.”44  Breaking down the divide between acting 
Christianly and acting as part of the world is a key component in appreciating Bonhoeffer’s view 
of political action.  Jesus teachings in The Sermon on the Mount, recorded in Matthew 5-7, are a 
way of pointing Christians toward action within this unity.  Not as universal moral standards or 
laws, but proclamations of the Gospel as though neither the church nor government are 
subordinate to one another.  These proclamations are motivated by and legitimized by God’s 
love.  
The historical responsibility of the Christian is rooted in God having reconciled himself 
to the world through Christ as an act of love.  In Bonhoeffer’s view, much of Western 
philosophy has misunderstood the Christian concept of love by turning Jesus’ teachings into 
metaphysical pseudo-realisms.  He writes that “[l]ove—as understood by the Gospel in contrast 
to all Philosophy—is not a method for dealing with people.  Instead, it is the reality of being 
drawn and drawing others into an event, namely, into God’s community with the world […].  
‘Love’ does not exist as an abstract attribute of God but only in God’s actual loving of human 
beings and the world.”45  To act as a Christian is to share in this fact with others by bringing 
them into that community of corporate love for Christ and for the world, i.e. the church.  Just as 
God’s love appears as an incarnational fact in the person of Jesus, the love of God is also 
incarnate through the communal action of the church. 
Christian love, therefore, is not a “pure” love devoid of worldly connections and 
understanding as a thing in itself, but precisely the opposite.  The Sermon on the Mount, is “the 
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proclamation of the incarnate love of God;” Jesus, teaching people to love each other by sharing 
in the circumstances of historical life through community.46  Therefore, “Jesus’ teaching regards 
us responsible for others and knows nothing of persons as isolated individuals.”47  Put another 
way, because of what Christ has done, Christians are called to share in the struggles of 
brokenness and suffering in their midst in the same way that Christ shared in the suffering of 
human life on the cross, as well as witnessing the painful experiences of his friends and family.48  
God’s love for the world came into being as Jesus Christ; Christ’s love for the world took place 
through his teachings and actions on the cross; Christian love is expressed through actions in the 
world as members of the church-community.  Bonhoeffer believes that Jesus, through example 
and action, places responsibility on the shoulders of Christians to act in history as he did.  
Furthermore, since Jesus’ teaching and life embraces and reconciles all of human life to 
God, his love for human beings is not reserved for some people of preferred circumstances but 
withheld from others.  Because God’s love incarnate in Christ is not limited, “so the love that 
springs from the love of God cannot be limited to specific areas and relationships of life.”49  
Such a love must encompass everything, including political action.  As a consequence, “political 
action means taking on responsibility.”50  Answering the “call” of Christ (a term Bonhoeffer will 
use in Letters and Papers from Prison) does not mean that Christians must only act out of self-
denial in moments of personal piety, or only affirm the individual ‘rights’ of selfhood found in 
Western political liberalism.  Contrary to the thinking of Bonhoeffer’s friend and teacher at 
Union Seminary, Reinhold Niebuhr, to separate individual Christian morality from the, in some 
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sense, larger arena of political morality would be to create a false “dual morality.”51  From the 
standpoint of Christian action in the world, the two are united by the love of God.  The Sermon 
on the Mount is, according to Bonhoeffer’s reading, Jesus’ call for Christians to act responsibly 
in history and not forego the concerns of this life and the sufferings of others.  
It is through these invocations of The Sermon on the Mount that the challenge of 
Bonhoeffer’s life with respect to his Christian commitments becomes palpable.  As the biblical 
account is recorded in Matthew 5, Jesus speaks several times about murder and treatment of 
one’s enemies.  These passages reveal how Bonhoeffer’s assistance to the conspiracy becomes 
problematic in light of Christ’s call to act responsibly as a servant of the embodiment of God’s 
love.52  In fact, Jesus argues that although his followers may have heard about ethical 
expectations set forth by ancient Israelite law, the actual commands are far stricter than they had 
been taught.  Followers of God are not merely to abstain from murder, they are culpable for 
merely becoming angry at their enemies.  They are not merely to demonstrate the love of God to 
their friends and family, they are expected to extend that love toward their bitter enemies.  The 
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responsible action which Bonhoeffer connects to Christ’s teachings includes love for enemies.  
As Jesus himself concludes, “Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly father is perfect.”53   
After Ten Years: A Bold Venture of Faith 
 A decade after Bonhoeffer writes “The Church and the Jewish Question,” his perspective 
on the cultural climate of Germany had become more critical.  As New Year’s Eve of 1942, 
passed and 1943 began, Bonhoeffer penned his reflective essay “After Ten Years.”  Here we find 
one of his first allusions to the ethical consequences of his participation in the assassination 
conspiracy.  Furthermore, his commentary on standing fast against injustice and exposing the 
folly of the German people throughout the crisis is striking.  
 Bonhoeffer begins by affirming again (as he would also do in Ethics) that the “evil” of 
Nazism had appeared to the German people “disguised as light, charity, historical necessity, or 
social justice,” having bewildered people’s ethical sensibilities.54  That such suffering and 
destruction could have come from what many thought would be a movement of restoration and 
unity had surprised “anyone brought up on out traditional ethical concepts.”55  Indeed, in a 
society so devoted to service toward authorities, the heinous betrayal of Hitler’s regime would 
have been difficult to foresee or comprehend.  
 Bonhoeffer goes on to describe the failure of German society to prevent the atrocities in 
more detail, outlining the kinds of values and character failures which had been characteristic of 
the ethical responses of his peers.  These categories are not intended to represent specific groups 
or individuals, but are ethical commitments which Bonhoeffer claims his experience has 
identified as destructive currents within Germany.  So-called ‘reasonable’ people had naively 
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believed they could “bend back into position the framework that [had] got out of joint” by trying 
to “do justice to both sides” – trying to form compromises when the reality of the world would 
allow none.56  Worse still were ‘moral fanatics,’ exhausting themselves by blindly appealing to 
“single-minded principles” without the wisdom to recognize who their real enemies were.57  
Next, individuals driven by a commitment to following the call of their ‘conscience’ or 
responding to ‘duty’ fared no better.  While the former “becomes nervous and vacillating” when 
confronted by conflict brought on by the “respectable and seductive disguises” of the enemy, the 
latter can be led astray by the authority of whatever power they feel obliged to.58  What is more, 
those who assert their ‘freedom’ as the guiding principle of responsible action can too easily fall 
into pursuing the injustices of one’s own unrestrained interests.  Expressions of radical freedom 
produce nothing on their own.  Finally, there are those who avoid engaging in historical realities 
by retreating into the safety of ‘private virtuousness.’  Bonhoeffer concludes that a person can 
“[o]nly do this at the cost of self-deception” and a fear of opposing the destruction around them.  
Bonhoeffer believes that a quiet and personal virtue is not sufficient to restore or cultivate 
civil courage in Germany.  But even a public virtuousness, while essential to shining a light on 
injustice, is not and cannot be the whole of a Christian ethic.  For Bonhoeffer, as long as reality 
is orientated around the revelation of Christ, it is nonsense for Christians to consider ethics in 
terms of personal improvement or identifying examples of moral behavior and turning those 
actions into grand principles.  Worse still is contemplating the principles of any ethic apart from 
time and place considerations.  It is ultimately fruitless to try and pin down a single ethical 
incarnation divorced from its historical circumstances and remove Christ from the center of life. 
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To abstract ethical life away from the specific circumstances of life would be the ultimate form 
of self-defeat.  “[A]nyone who does this (private virtuousness) must shut his eyes to the injustice 
around him.”59  One must be willing to extend Christ’s reality to the world through real-life 
actions. 
These descriptions are vague and not intended to be a systematic cultural diagnosis.  
Bonhoeffer himself begins the essay by explaining that these insights are “conclusions reached 
more or less in common by a circle of like-minded people” who share Bonhoeffer’s concerns 
about the failure of Germany’s political and moral institutions to prevent the events of the 
previous decade.  However, the analysis he presents here draws us back to the core ethical claim 
made by Bonhoeffer throughout his work:  
Who stands fast?  Only the man whose final standard is not his reason, principles, his 
conscience, his freedom, or his virtue, but who is ready to sacrifice all this when he is 
called to obedient and responsible action in faith and in exclusive allegiance to God—the 
responsible man, who tries to make his whole life an answer to the question and call of 
God.60   
Bonhoeffer’s claim here echoes what we have seen in his Ethics: the central ethical concern of 
Christian responsibility in the world is not about being a particular sort of person, not is it about 
adhering to a standard of anything.  The responsible Christian “depends on a God who demands 
responsible action in a bold venture of faith, and who promises forgiveness and consolation to 
the man who becomes a sinner in that venture.”61  It is this faith in the mercy of God in light of 
Christ’s call to historical action that Bonhoeffer’s ethical standing with the Abwehr conspiracy 
becomes clear.  He will not absolve himself on the basis of principles, laws, necessity, or aretaic 
pursuits.  From the standpoint of God’s judgment, Bonhoeffer hopes only for grace.  Expanding 
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on this point he writes, “[t]he immanent righteousness of history rewards and punishes men’s 
deeds, but the eternal righteousness of God tries and judges their hearts.”62  Before the laws and 
standards of human artifice, Bonhoeffer may find himself absolved as a hero or martyr.  But 
before the ultimate Christian ethical concern, the will of God, Bonhoeffer refuses to justify 
himself. 
“Jonah” 
 The question of whether or not Bonhoeffer actually viewed his actions as sinful has yet to 
be determined from what has been said so far.  Complicating matters is that Bonhoeffer seems to 
sway back and forth on this question during his stay in prison.  While in Tegel military prison in 
Berlin during 1943, he writes in “After Ten Years”: 
The world is, in fact, so ordered that a basic respect for ultimate laws and human life is 
also the best means of self-preservation, and that these laws may be broken only on the 
odd occasion in case of brief necessity, whereas anyone who turns necessity into a 
principle, and in so doing establishes a law of his own alongside them, is inevitably 
bound, sooner or later, to suffer retribution.63   
This quotation exemplifies the sort of comment which breeds confusion about Bonhoeffer’s 
approach to political resistance and the ethical consequences of participating in such resistance. 
While on one hand, he mentions the possibility of suspending the “ultimate laws” in some 
circumstances, he immediately turns back and warns his readers against forcing this possibility 
into a principle of action.  Some circumstances may require them to violate the ultimate laws, but 
they cannot make a habit or rule out of doing so.  Problematically, as is characteristic of 
Bonhoeffer, we are given little in the way of substance to resolve this confusion.  What are these 
“ultimate laws” which can be violated?  How are Christians to know when the “odd occasion” 
arises for them to step beyond these laws in pursuit of some other just cause? 
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 Perhaps part of the answer lies in what Bonhoeffer has already written about the ethics of 
one’s historical circumstances: “God’s commandment cannot be found and known apart from 
time and place; indeed it can only be heard by one who is bound to a specific time and place.”64  
Bonhoeffer’s warning against creating principles of action is necessary if God’s call can only be 
heard in the midst of individual circumstances.  Whether or not such “ultimate laws” exist is a 
secondary matter compared with obedience to the will of God.  And violating said laws (the 
existence of which Bonhoeffer is inconsistent about) is possible if Christ is the center, as 
opposed to the laws themselves.  If we take the “bold venture of faith” claim to be the key to 
Bonhoeffer’s ethical claims in “After Ten Years;” at least, in terms of what is relevant to the 
problem of tyrannicide, we can recognize the possibility of sin in violation of the “ultimate laws” 
because such laws would have to be authorized by and through God.  To violate the laws in 
moments of odd necessity is, by virtue of the centrality of Christ, akin to violating Jesus himself.  
Even if Bonhoeffer were to develop a more sophisticated view of these ‘ultimate laws,’ his 
Christological and ethical views would still require that these laws be grounded for and through 
Christ. 
 But because Bonhoeffer does not directly address the question of his sin anywhere in his 
corpus, and because his commentary in “After Ten Years” highlights a tension between acting in 
a “bold venture of faith” and the so-called “ultimate laws,” I will suggest a more personal 
approach to the sin question.  In one of the final known writings Bonhoeffer produces before his 
execution, a poem entitled “Jonah,” he presents the story of the Old Testament prophet’s struggle 
to flee the call of Yahweh on a ship caught in a great storm: 
“In fear of death they cried aloud and, clinging fast                                                                          
to wet ropes and straining on the battered deck,                                                                          
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they gazed in stricken terror at the sea                                                                                          
that now, unchained in a sudden, lashed the ship. 
‘O gods eternal, excellent, provoked to anger,                                                                            
help us, or give a sign, that we may know                                                                                   
who has offended you by secret sin,                                                                                               
by breach of oath, or heedless blasphemy , or murder, 
who brings to us disaster by misdeed still hidden,                                                                           
to make a paltry profit for his pride.’                                                                                          
Thus they besought.  And Jonah said, ‘Behold,                                                                                
I sinned before the Lord of hosts.  My life is forfeit. 
Cast me away!  My guilt must bear the wrath of God;                                                                    
the righteous shall not perish with the sinner!’                                                                           
They trembled.  But with hands that knew no weakness                                                               
they cast the offender from their midst.  The sea stood still.”65 
Bethge recalls that Bonhoeffer writes this poem near the beginning of October of 1944.  
According to Bethge’s account, Bonhoeffer gave up on any plans of escape from prison during 
this period and “faced a new series of interrogations by the Reich Security Head Office.”66  The 
interrogations themselves, persisting often for weeks at a time, began to take heavy 
psychological toll on Bonhoeffer, especially during the early months of 1945.67  While it is 
impossible to know Bonhoeffer’s exact frame of mind when the “Jonah” poem was written, I do 
not think it is a stretch to suggest that he was under enormous duress.  The Abwehr plot had 
failed in July in 1944, the prison interrogations had become increasingly harsh and frequent, and 
Berlin—the residence of Bonhoeffer’s family throughout the war—suffered from frequent 
bombings from Allied air forces.  It is possible, of course, that Bonhoeffer’s poem is just a 
meaningless indulgence written to pass time in prison (he never states otherwise).  I contend, 
however, that Bonhoeffer’s collected poetry from LPFP is likely more revealing of his internal 
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reflections on the subject of sin than his theological dialogues with Bethge.  The tone and subject 
matter of “Jonah” are, if nothing else, teasingly a propos.  
We can interpret parallels between the narrative of the poem and Bonhoeffer’s own 
experience: adrift in the midst of a crisis, Bonhoeffer cries out in existential tension.  His friends 
and family are at risk, both within the prison and in the outside world, yet his efforts against 
Hitler may have endangered them by risking their well-being to reprisals from the regime.  
Bonhoeffer had written before in Cost of Discipleship and Ethics on the call to love enemies and 
the seriousness of God’s prohibition of murder, yet his actions were complicit in at least 
attempted murder.  We recall from an earlier poem “Who Am I?” that Bonhoeffer wrestles with 
self-doubt over his identity in the wake of his imprisonment.  Furthermore, his paraphrase of 
Jonah, “My guilt must bear the wrath of God” is pertinent in light of his claim in “After Ten 
Years” that the bold venture of faith is only sensible when responsible Christians are dependent 
on a God “who promises forgiveness and consolation” to the person who ventures out and falls 
into sin.68  What is more, the storm surrounding Jonah and his shipmates is calmed only when 
the prophet announces his guilt and is thrown overboard.  “This sea stood still” after Jonah dove 
into the sea.  Aware of his guilt in running from Yahweh’s call, Jonah throws himself into the 
judgment of the God whom he has defied.  Perhaps Bonhoeffer’s reflections on the bold venture 
of faith during his years in prison are his Jonah moment: he finds himself at sea, a sinner, ready 
to take the final plunge.  He writes, after all, “God’s commandment cannot be found and known 
apart from time and place; indeed, it can only be heard by one who is bound to a specific place 
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and time.”69  Jonah hears God’s call in the midst of the storm and jumps in order to save his 
comrades.  
One final time, Bonhoeffer’s reflections draw his readers back to the shared humanity 
God has with creation through Jesus.  To suffer as Bonhoeffer does in the “Jonah” poem 
represents a core Christian connection to the humanity of Christ.  In July of 1944, four months 
before Bonhoeffer writes “Jonah,” he pens a letter to Bethge arguing that the New Testament 
account of Christ in Gethsemane the night before his crucifixion shows God’s call for his 
followers to share in his suffering.70  Not for the sake of suffering itself, or even for the sake of 
personal edification through perseverance, but as a means of coming to know and experience 
God within the circumstances of real life.  Hence, Bonhoeffer’s claim that “Man is summoned to 
share in God’s sufferings at the hands of a godless world.”71  Bonhoeffer understands God to be 
one who suffers along with his human children, not only in the direct experiences of Jesus, but as 
a divine Father who must witness the rejection of the world against him.  To act responsibly in 
the world—or, as has been established before, to act out of love in the world—is itself a form of 
coming to know God.  
 The suffering Bonhoeffer endures in prison is akin to the suffering Peter ought to have 
endured with Jesus in Gethsemane.  Not because Bonhoeffer or Peter were guiltless during their 
pursuit of God, having earned their right to suffer with their Lord, but because following the call 
in light of Jesus’ life and teaching is what is means to be Christian.  This is why Bonhoeffer 
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claims that his life “would have a meaning [he] thinks [he] could understand.”72  Not because he 
can be absolved of his guilt for conspiring to commit murder, but because he acted in a bold 
venture of faith against injustice.   
 Finally, we can recall another poem which I quoted at the beginning of this thesis, “Who 
am I?” in which Bonhoeffer relays a similar sense of self-doubt that we find in “Jonah.”  He 
writes in the final lines:  
Who am I?  This or the other?                                                                                                           
Am I one person today, and tomorrow another?                                                                               
Am I both at once?  A hypocrite before others,                                                                                  
and before myself a contemptibly woebegone weakling?                                                                
Or is something within me still like a beaten army,                                                                          
fleeing in disorder from victory already achieved?73 
There can be little doubt that Bonhoeffer’s final years in prison forced the pastor to examine the 
spiritual and ethical implications of his life.  If Bonhoeffer’s letters and poetry from prison imply 
any hint of guilt, then his readers ought to be struck by the magnitude of this view given his 
belief in Christ as the center of reality.  Even Bonhoeffer’s most renowned (or infamous) 
historical achievement demands that his students focus on the reconciliation of all things through 
Jesus Christ.  Not even the abhorrence of Hitler and Nazism could create an existential evil so 
severe that the Christian could stand in the presence of God without confessing an eternal need 
for forgiveness.  The ethical problem of tyrannicide for someone whose sole basis for ethical 
thought is the expression of God’s love through the person a Christ bears a heavy burden.  
Bonhoeffer’s political theology does not allow him to ground any basis for ethical action outside 
of Jesus Christ.  No theory of just war or programmatic moral standard can excuse Bonhoeffer 
from his primary obligation to the will of God.  For that reason, Bonhoeffer’s political theology 
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can only be characterized as one of faith.  After all, Bonhoeffer concludes his ruminations in 
“Who Am I?” thusly: 
Who am I?  They mock me, these lonely questions of mine.                                                           
Whoever I am, thou knowest, O God, I am thine.74  
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CONCLUSION 
 
On July 20, 1944, the German resistance movement’s assassination attempt against 
Adolph Hitler ended in failure.  The bombing of a military conference at the so-called “Wolf’s 
Lair” [Wolfsschanze] had resulted in the deaths of a handful of Gestapo members, but Hitler 
himself survived with superficial injuries.  Shortly afterward, Bonhoeffer’s association with 
other members of the resistance was uncovered and he was transferred out of Tegel military 
prison in Berlin.  After several subsequent transfers, he ultimately arrived at Flossenbürg 
concentration camp, where he would be executed by hanging on April 9, 1945.  
Bonhoeffer’s final letters written after the resistance’s failure are filled with a doubling-
down of his emphasis on the “profound this-worldliness of Christianity;” so much so that he 
outlined plans for a book to be written on the subject of a “religionless Christianity.” 1  What is 
more, his letters to Bethge during these final months demonstrate a fervent commitment to his 
writing and speculations on what it meant to live for Christ apart from the religious and 
philosophical traditions that  had so profoundly failed to prevent the rise of the crisis in 
Germany.  His final theological musings focus on discipleship toward Christ apart from 
institutions and ritual practices of the contemporary world.  What is more, this religionless 
Christianity challenges what Bonhoeffer believes to be the common way of talking about God.  
This common way places God at the boundaries or limits of human knowledge and experience, 
much like the modern and classical philosophies Bonhoeffer wishes to reject.  He fears that 
people “speak of God when human knowledge […] has come to an end, or when human 
resources come to an end.”2  This instrumental way of talking about God is a distraction from 
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true Christian concern with living in the world.  It is instrumental because the space that God 
occupies in human experience is now pushed back to the realm of the unknown.  Much like Isaac 
Newton’s characterization of the ‘god-of-the-gaps,’ the common invocation of God comes when 
people have reached the peak of the knowledge or ability.  When science no longer explains 
some question, God fills the gap.  When hurtful experiences push a person to their emotional 
limit, God comes in to address the wounds when daily routines and relationships cannot.  
Bonhoeffer calls this deus ex machina attitude an oversimplification of biblical teaching.  The 
Christological center of Bonhoeffer’s theology challenges this view by seeing Jesus in middle of 
human life through all experiences, whether they are menial or extravagant.  Bonhoeffer is 
consistent from the beginning of his theological explorations until the final months of his life 
when it comes to the importance of Christ and the faith connection his followers have with him.   
 Final Summary  
 In this thesis, I have argued that Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s political theology is rooted in his 
desire to view Jesus Christ as the center of reality.  In order to accomplish this, Bonhoeffer’s 
work focuses on how Christians can view human experiences through the importance of what 
God has done through Christ.  This focus prevents Bonhoeffer from accepting any basis for 
ethical or political thought that does not appeal to God as the final authority, and to Christ as the 
primary character in the development of historical events.  This Christo-centric view, which I 
and others have called Bonhoeffer’s Christology, leads to Bonhoeffer’s conclusion that nature 
exists to affirm the reality of the Gospel, and that God has demarcated elements of human 
experience to direct human brings toward that reality.  The elements of human experience tasked 
with this role are called mandates.  These mandates (church, government, family, and work) exist 
to keep the possibility of being open to discipleship toward Christ.  Thus, Bonhoeffer begins his 
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canon of work with the belief that the natural human experience is one directed toward an 
affirmation of Jesus Christ as God’s expression of salvation and love.  All subsequent concerns, 
including ethics and politics, must be grounded in this fundamental beginning.   
 As a result of this Christology, Bonhoeffer’s view of ethics begins with the belief that 
Christians must ask themselves this question: what is the will of God?  No other question can be 
more primordial to an exploration of ethics given Bonhoeffer’s belief in Christ as the center.  
Because of this question, Bonhoeffer rejects other ethical programs which he believes set the 
fundamental concern of ethics apart from God’s immediate concern with human life.  To be 
concerned first and foremost with being a good person, discovering what the good is, or obeying 
a standard of goodness other than God himself, would be unacceptably starting places for any 
inquiry into Christian ethics.  Instead, Bonhoeffer concludes that the ethical must be authorized 
by God himself, not any source ‘below’ his command.  Human beings can never apprehend the 
will of God in a fully disclosed way, but the ethical can be encountered through the natural 
experience of the four mandates tasked with revealing Christ to the world.  Within the 
confinement of the circumstances of life, individuals can encounter the meaning of Christ in the 
world and behave in fidelity to that revelation.  With limited understanding, human beings have 
the capacity to open themselves to the work of God in the world by experiencing the revelation 
of his love through the concerns of daily life.  Faith in the revelation of God as it is experienced 
through daily life -- whether that comes via scripture, church teaching, personal experiences of 
love and edification, or suffering at the hands of the world – keeps the possibility to discipleship 
toward Jesus open.  Bonhoeffer believes that if ethics can begin anywhere for the Christian, it 
must be with this perspective in mind.  
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  Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the relationship between church and government is 
informed by these theological and ethical perspectives, and is colored further by the intrusions of 
the Nazi state into the sanctity of the German Evangelical churches.  Because God has issued 
mandates for church and government to each play a role in the formation of individuals as 
Christian believers, Bonhoeffer argues that it is anti-God for one mandate to infringe on the role 
of the other.  The introduction of the Nazi-backed “Aryan Paragraph” into the bylaws of German 
Protestant churches banning participation of baptized Jewish Christians in the churches was the 
first violation Bonhoeffer chose to address during the crisis.  In this essay “Church and the 
Jewish Question,” Bonhoeffer’s earliest articulation of the possibility of resistance against 
government comes in response to an affront against the church.  In opposition to the Lutheran 
orthodoxy of his day, Bonhoeffer argued that the government can be resisted by the church in 
three ways: moral questioning of state actions, assistance toward the victims of the state, and 
direct political action in opposition to the state’s interests.  While little detail is provided in this 
early rendition of Bonhoeffer’s political theology, the basis of later themes is established.  
  During Bonhoeffer’s final years (1940-1945), his writings reflect a deep concern for 
understanding how Christians are to live in the here and now.  His unfinished magnum opus, 
Ethics, as well as Eberhard Bethge’s compilations in Letters and Papers from Prison, explore the 
fundamental question of extending Bonhoeffer’s Christological views to the circumstances of 
daily human life.  Although his approach is unsystematic, his arguments conform to the real-
world actions he engaged in on behalf of the Abwehr conspiracy.  Specifically, his belief in the 
separate mandates of church and government became firmer as the depth of Nazi atrocities 
became increasingly apparent.  In the final section on Bonhoeffer’s views of church and 
government, I argued that Bonhoeffer rejected any basis of government which he understood to 
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be ‘below,’ or founded outside the biblical claim that all things have been made through and for 
Christ.  Because Bonhoeffer accepts this biblical claim, his view of government is directly linked 
to his Christology.  Government exists as a force tasked with restraining the powers of chaos and 
injustice in this world so that the other mandates (the church in particular) have the opportunity 
to proclaim the Gospel.  As a result, Bonhoeffer accepts that the natural power of government 
constitutes the use of violence as a tool for increasing law and order, while preventing 
lawlessness and disorder.  Bonhoeffer’s later political theology understands government to be a 
biblically mandated force tasked with suppressing the effects of godlessness in the world.  But in 
this effort, government is not immune from guilt.  Contrary again to the prevailing Lutheran two- 
kingdoms doctrine, Bonhoeffer’s view of government expects sinfulness to accompany the 
government’s ability to wield the proverbial sword.  In the case of Nazi Germany, this anti-God 
disposition had reached unacceptable heights. 
 From the standpoint of the church-community, the collective body of Christians who 
affirm and preach the revelation of God through Christ, Bonhoeffer advocates responsible action 
in the world motivated by the teaching and accomplishments of Jesus in the Gospels.  
Bonhoeffer views Christ as God’s love incarnate, tasked with reconciling a godless world with 
its creator.  As such, Christ’s ethical teachings recorded in the Sermon on the Mount represent, in 
Bonhoeffer’s view, a biblical call for loving engagement with the world as a response to 
suffering and sin.  In the context of Nazi Germany, Bonhoeffer encourages Christians to allow 
the love of Christ to guide their response.  As such, he creates an ethical tension by seemingly 
contradicting Jesus’ command to love enemies and to show deference to the authority of 
government.  Bonhoeffer’s involvement with the Abwehr conspiracy prompts the question of sin 
with respect to his Christian ethical commitments.        
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Did Bonhoeffer view his complicit involvement with a tyrannicidal movement as a sin?  
The only extent to which he is able to answer that question leads us directly back to the 
Christology at the heart of his theological views.  We see from his comments in Ethics, “After 
Ten Years” and other letters, as well as allusions found in the “Jonah” poem that Bonhoeffer 
refuses to justify his decision.  He does not explicitly link his actions to the will of God, the core 
concern of his Christian ethics.  To be sure, he recognizes more clearly than most that Germany’s 
situation under Hitler’s stewardship is perilous.  The ethical question, as far as Bonhoeffer is 
concerned, is not dependent on a threshold of moral abhorrence which Hitler had not yet crossed.  
There is no standard of justice which Bonhoeffer appeals to in order to defend his decision.  
Instead, the “bold venture of faith,”3 the “blood [on which] lies heavy guilt,”4 the taking on of 
responsibility in political action through the love of Christ;5 all of these ingredients weave 
together into an acceptance of sinfulness in the midst of seeking to save a country from 
destruction.  Bonhoeffer ultimately points to the mercy of God as the only resting place for his 
actions.  If he has sinned in venturing out, he will be held to account by the God who he has 
claimed to obey. 
If it is possible to encapsulate Bonhoeffer’s worldview at all, I would point to a poem he 
writes for his mother a few months before his execution in December of 1944.  The letter 
containing the poem, written close to New Year’s Eve, comes during a time when many of 
Bonhoeffer’s friends and associates had been killed, the Allied powers were conducting aerial 
bombings of Berlin, and Bonhoeffer himself had begun to come to terms with the likelihood of 
his death.  Aside from one final letter requesting a few books and hygienic supplies, this poem 
                                                     
3 LPFP, 6 
4 Bethge, 155 
5 Ethics, 245 
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was the last known correspondence Bonhoeffer had with his family.  Having been transported to 
and from several different prisons, Bonhoeffer’s family and fiancée could not be certain their 
final responses ever reached him before the execution.  In the poem, entitled “Powers of Good,” 
Bonhoeffer’s last Christological refrain can be found.       
POWERS OF GOOD 
Should it be ours to drain the cup of grieving 
even to the dregs of pain, at thy command, 
we will not falter, thankfully receiving 
all that is given by thy loving hand. 
But should it be thy will once more to release us  
to life's enjoyment and its good sunshine, 
that which we've learned from sorrow shall increase us, 
and all our life be dedicate as thine. 
Today, let candles shed their radiant greeting; 
lo, on our darkness are they not light  
leading us, haply, to our longed-for meeting? - 
Thou canst illumine even our darkest night. 
When now the silence deepens for our harkening, 
grant we may hear thy children's voices raise 
from all the unseen world around us darkening  
their universal paean, in thy praise. 
While all the powers of good aid and attend us, 
boldly we'll face the future, come what may. 
At even and at morn God will befriend us, 
and oh, most surely on each newborn day!6 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                     
6 LPFP, 400 
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